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Notice: Aircraft Lien Law in Florida 
TIMOTHY M. RAVICH* 
 Establishing (e.g., perfecting) and enforcing a lien pre-
sents technical pitfalls and practical problems with which 
practitioners and courts are often unfamiliar or uncomfort-
able. After all, the law of liens requires an understanding of 
many different areas of the law, including the law of con-
tract, bailment, unjust enrichment, and customary law. But 
among the most fraught with uncertainty are mechanic’s 
liens, which establish a right in favor of persons—“arti-
sans”—performing or furnishing labor, services, fuel, or 
material upon personal property. Florida’s mechanic’s lien 
statute raises particularly challenging legal issues as ap-
plied to aircraft.  
 In Florida, the perfection and enforcement of a me-
chanic’s lien as against an aircraft is rarely plain or intui-
tive. To get from lien perfection to lien foreclosure, aviation 
and commercial law practitioners must travel from Flor-
ida’s general mechanic’s lien statute through a mosaic of 
other state statutes, including a standalone chapter related 
to aviation. Along the way, equitable considerations, like the 
need for injunctive relief and the law of replevin and tort 
(e.g., conversion), likely come into play. Finally, lienors 
must satisfy an exacting federal statutory recording scheme 
and navigate a corresponding body of decisional law that 
raises thorny issues of federalism, priority, and preemption. 
 The final tally: Perfection and enforcement of a me-
chanic’s lien in Florida requires the command of a minimum 
of four different Florida statutory chapters that rarely (and 
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rarely clearly) cross-reference each other, several federal 
statutes that frequently have no obvious relationship to state 
lien law, and scattered decisional law rendered at every 
level of the judiciary. This is to say nothing of the interna-
tional law regime governing the registration of airplanes 
and airplane parts or the likelihood that an aircraft may al-
ready be encumbered by the lien or priority mechanisms of 
another state or states.  
 But the most problematic aspect of Florida’s statutory 
regime for mechanic’s liens, which is at the center of this 
Article, is the role possession plays in perfecting aircraft 
liens. Possession typically plays a decisive role in the area 
of lien law, animating the common law tenet that “posses-
sion is nine points of the law.” For more than a decade, how-
ever, Florida statutory law has presented an internally con-
flicted path toward lien perfection by also providing that 
possession is unnecessary. That is, under Florida law, a 
valid lien also could be created simply by recording a claim 
of lien. Recently, however, the Florida Legislature amended 
chapter 329, Florida Statutes, to clarify that possession is 
not required for lien perfection purposes; notice alone now 
suffices. 
 This Article discusses the possession versus notice prob-
lem inherent in the state’s statutory scheme and then ana-
lyzes the recent change to the law. In doing so, this Article 
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of Florida’s 
“new” mechanism for the perfection and enforcement of me-
chanic’s lien on aircraft, and argues in favor a statutory 
scheme that once and for all takes aircraft outside of Flor-
ida’s general mechanic’s lien statute, situating the subject of 
aircraft liens in a legal scheme that comprehensively pro-
vides for the perfection and enforcement of aircraft-specific 
artisan liens. Finally, this Article provides a comprehensive 
empirical review of the mechanic’s lien laws of every state 
in order to broadly contextualize how legislatures and courts 
around the nation approach the issue of perfection and no-
tice for lien perfection purposes. In all, this Article’s rele-
vance is greatest for aviation practitioners and courts adju-
dicating aviation liens in Florida and elsewhere, but it may 
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also hold interest for a wider audience seeking to achieve 
efficiencies in the interpretation and application of commer-
cial and secured transactions concerning personal property 
and mobile assets in analogous situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In substance and form, liens are not conceptually difficult to un-
derstand. Liens are claims against property that evidence a debt, ob-
ligation, or duty.1 Liens arise either consensually, as by agreement, 
or non-consensually, as by judgment,2 equity,3 or statute.4 They are 
usually effected by filing a verified itemized account of the demand 
due according to the relevant state or federal authority.5 In applica-
tion, however, the process of establishing (e.g., perfecting) and en-
forcing a lien presents technical pitfalls and practical problems with 
which practitioners and courts are often unfamiliar or uncomforta-
ble. After all, the law of liens requires an understanding of many 
different areas of the law, including the law of contract, bailment, 
unjust enrichment, and customary law.6 In addition, liens exist in 
favor of countless kinds of private and public creditors—from home 
mortgage lenders, to municipalities, to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.7 But among the most fraught with uncertainty are mechanic’s 
liens, which establish a right in favor of persons—“artisans”—per-
forming or furnishing labor, services, fuel, or material upon personal 
property.8 
 
 1 34 FLA. JUR. 2d Liens § 1 (2014). 
 2 William W. Kannel & Ericm R. Blythe, Statutor Liens vs. Consensual 
Liens: Why It Matters and When It May Not, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/statutory-liens-vs-consensual-liens-why-
it-matters-and-when-it-may-not. 
 3 See Ralph E. Boyer & Barry Kutun, The Equitable Lien in Florida, 20 U. 
MIA. L. REV. 731, 731 (1966). 
 4 FLA. JUR. 2d Liens §12 (2014). 
 5 See Michael Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 193, 
196–97 (1959). 
 6 See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carbordum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (“[A] lien is . . . a device for preventing unjust enrichment . . . .”). 
 7 See Justin Pritchard, Liens: What They Are and How They Work, BALANCE 
(July 29, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/liens-what-they-are-and-how-they-
work-315611 (discussing different kinds of liens). 
 8 See Mark Sauer, Ohio’s New and Improved Mechanic’s Lien Statutes: In 
Pursuit of Legitimacy, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 895, 895–97 (1996) (describing me-
chanic’s liens and explaining why the law of mechanic’s liens have become “in-
creasingly complicated”); 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & DAVID OLIVEIRI, NIMMER’S 
COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING § 16:45 (2020) (using the terms “arti-
san’s liens” and “mechanic’s liens” interchangeably). 
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Florida’s mechanic’s lien statute raises particularly challenging 
legal issues as applied to aircraft. In Florida, the perfection and en-
forcement of a mechanic’s lien as against an aircraft is rarely plain 
or intuitive. This is unexpected given how seemingly clear the oper-
ative mechanic’s lien statute appears on its face. Section 713.58, 
Florida Statutes, establishes a general lien “[i]n favor of persons per-
forming labor or services for any other person, upon the personal 
property of the latter upon which the labor or services is per-
formed.”9 Part of the confusion is that, so far as liens on aircraft are 
concerned, section 713.58 is a starting point rather than a destina-
tion. 
Indeed, to get from lien perfection to lien foreclosure, aviation 
and commercial law practitioners must travel from Florida’s general 
mechanic’s lien statute through a mosaic of other state statutes, in-
cluding a standalone chapter related to aviation.10 Section 329.51 of 
that chapter provides that any lien claimed on an aircraft pursuant to 
Florida’s general law mechanic’s lien, section 713.58, “is enforcea-
ble when the lienor records a verified lien notice with the clerk of 
the circuit court where the aircraft was located at the time the labor, 
services, fuel, or material was last furnished.”11 Florida law then re-
quires practitioners and courts to jump to section 85.011, Florida 
Statutes, which governs the enforcement of all statutory liens.12 
Along the way, equitable considerations, like the need for injunctive 
relief and the law of replevin and tort (e.g., conversion), likely come 
into play. Finally, lienors must satisfy an exacting federal statutory 
recording scheme and navigate a corresponding body of decisional 
law that raises thorny issues of federalism, priority, and preemp-
tion.13 
The final tally: Perfection and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien 
in Florida requires the command of a minimum of four different 
 
 9 FLA. STAT. § 713.58(1) (2020). 
 10 See FLA. STAT. §§ 329.01–329.51 (2020). 
 11 FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020); see also FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020) (provid-
ing that liens for fuel furnished to aircraft are “enforceable in the same manner as 
provided in [section] 329.51”). 
 12 FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020). 
 13 See Robert C. Newark, III, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 708, 710–11 
(2006) (discussing Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Commerce Tr. Co., 289 So. 2d 37, 
38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), where both state laws and Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (“FAA”) regulations were at issue). 
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Florida statutory chapters that rarely (and rarely clearly) cross-ref-
erence each other (Chapters 78, 85, 329, and 713), several federal 
statutes that frequently have no obvious relationship to state lien 
law, and scattered decisional law rendered at every level of the ju-
diciary. This is to say nothing of the international law regime gov-
erning the registration of airplanes and airplane parts14 or the likeli-
hood that an aircraft may already be encumbered by the lien or pri-
ority mechanisms of another state or states.15 In all, navigating 
through the maze of lien laws at the state, national, and international 
levels is challenging and leads to administrative and practical inef-
ficiencies. To be sure, these challenges are surmountable. However, 
they serve as important background for an even larger substantive 
concern that has long troubled Florida practitioners and courts, and 
which is at the center of this Article: What role does possession play 
in perfecting aircraft liens under Florida law? 
Ostensibly, the answer is that possession plays not only an im-
portant role, but also a decisive one. After all, the adage that “pos-
session is nine points of the law” is a basic tenet of the common law, 
and its animating idea—that the exercise of rights frequently rises 
and falls with possession—is beyond doubt in common law legal 
systems around the world.16 Every court to have considered Flor-
ida’s general mechanic’s lien law, in fact, has recognized that pos-
session is the sine qua non of the lien17—an understanding that dates 
back at least to the times of medieval lawyers in whose eyes “[p]os-
session largely usurped not only the substance but the name of Prop-
erty.”18 Florida’s general mechanic’s lien law has coincided with the 
 
 14 See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 2, 
Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108–10 (2003). This Article focuses on liens 
on aircraft as opposed to liens on aircraft subcomponents or ancillaries, such as 
avionics and engines. Perfection and enforcement of liens on such aircraft parts is 
an area of the law unto itself. See, e.g., In re S. Air Transp., Inc., 255 B.R. 715, 
718 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (evaluating whether Florida’s statutory lien scheme 
applies to spare aircraft parts). 
 15 See infra Appendix. 
 16 See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 245 (Jennifer Speake ed., 2015) 
(citing THOMAS DRAXE, BIBLIOTHECA SCHOLASTICA INSTRUCTISSIMA 163 
(1616)); FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON 
POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 1 (1888). 
 17 See, e.g., In re Garland Corp., 6 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980). 
 18 POLLOCK & WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 5. 
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common law in this regard by virtue of being inseparably connected 
with possession and the view that “the right of the creditor to retain 
the possession of the article, created or enhanced in value by his la-
bor, [endures] till the compensation due for his labor thereon was 
paid.”19 This deeply engrained and universal concept—that perfec-
tion (and to a lesser extent, enforcement) of a lien go hand-in-hand 
with possession of the personal property upon which an artisan pro-
vides labor or services—applies almost automatically to just about 
every one of the more than two dozen mechanic’s liens recognized 
under Florida law.20 But in the context of aircraft liens, turbulence 
best explains the relationship between possession and perfection. 
The title and body of Chapter 329, Florida Statutes, reveals why 
this is so. Until recently, section 329.51 provided: 
329.51 Liens for labor, services, fuel, or material ex-
pended upon aircraft; notice. 
Any lien claimed on an aircraft under [sec-
tion] 329.4121 or [section] 713.5822 is enforceable 
when the lienor records a verified lien notice with the 
clerk of the circuit court in the county where the air-
craft was located at the time the labor, services, fuel, 
or material was last furnished. The lienor must record 
such lien notice within [ninety] days after the time 
the labor, services, fuel, or material was last fur-
nished. The notice must state the name of the lienor; 
the name of the owner; a description of the aircraft 
upon which the lienor has expended labor, services, 
fuel, or material; the amount for which the lien is 
claimed; and the date the expenditure was completed. 
This section does not affect the priority of competing 
 
 19 N.C. Manson, Jr., Note, Mechanics’ Liens, 2 VA. L. REG. 489, 489 (1896). 
 20 See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001– .37 (2020) (construction liens). 
 21 FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2017) (lien for fuel furnished to aircraft) (“A person 
who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft for any unpaid 
fuel charges. The lien is enforceable in the same manner as provided in [section] 
329.51.”). 
 22 FLA. STAT. § 713.58 (2017) (liens for labor or services on personal prop-
erty). 
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interests in any aircraft or the lienor’s obligation to 
record the lien under [section] 329.01.23 
In 2010, in Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A,24 Florida’s 
Third District Court of Appeal rejected an argument that this statu-
tory language amended section 713.58 by providing that a valid lien 
can be created simply by recording a claim of lien within ninety 
days.25 “[S]ection 329.51 does not create any new lien rights,” the 
court held; “[i]nstead, it is manifestly a notice statute, as is apparent 
by its title” and the fact that the statute specifically states that it ap-
plies to liens that are possessory in nature, for example, “[a]ny lien 
claimed on an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58.”26 
This rationale effectively rendered section 329.51 of no effect 
whatever, creating genuine confusion among maintenance, repair, 
and overhaul (“MRO”) providers and their counsel.27 If possession 
was all that mattered under Commercial Jet, Inc., then was notice 
under 329.51 still required? Stated otherwise, was possession alone 
sufficient to perfect a lien such that an MRO could perfect a me-
chanic’s lien without also satisfying the notice and recordation pro-
visions of section 329.51? If so, what purpose did section 329.51 
serve, if any? 
Commercial Jet, Inc. raised rather than resolved these and other 
elementary legal and practical questions, yet the case endured as 
precedent for almost a decade. In 2019, however, the Florida Legis-
lature amended Chapter 329, Florida Statutes, to clarify that posses-
sion is not required for purposes of perfecting a mechanic’s lien 
 
 23 FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2017); see also infra Part III. 
 24 Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 25 Id. at 888. 
 26 Id. (emphasis added). 
 27 This confusion was articulated by Judge Schwartz who issued a dissenting 
opinion. Id. at 889 (Scwartz, J., dissenting) (“The majority holding that [section 
329.51] did not have the effect specifically provided by the legislature is in con-
flict with just about every canon of legislative interpretation there is . . . . [A] stat-
ute dealing with a specific subject, such as aircraft, must be deemed to control 
over a general one such as section 713.58.”). 
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under state law.28 Notice alone suffices.29 In doing so, the Legisla-
ture validated the dissenting opinion in Commercial Jet, Inc., which 
rebutted the majority’s decision as producing “conflict with just 
about every cannon of legislative interpretation there is.”30 
This Article evaluates the possession versus notice problem in-
herent in a statutory scheme that effectively required the near con-
temporaneous application of Florida’s possession-centric general 
mechanic’s lien law (section 713.58) alongside Florida’s aviation-
specific and notice-only law (section 329.51) in favor of artisans 
who provide labor, service, fuel, or material upon aircraft. To frame 
this discussion, Part I explains why and how the possession versus 
notice problem is unusual when compared to other statutory lien 
schemes and yet unremarkable (albeit unique) when measured 
against the manner by which the law has historically treated an air-
craft as an asset. Part II then describes the statutory and decisional 
law in Florida respecting aviation liens, tracking the universe of de-
cisions on the matter.31 Following a review of these court opinions, 
Part III analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Florida’s 
“new” mechanism for the perfection and enforcement of mechanic’s 
lien on aircraft, arguing in favor of a statutory scheme that once and 
 
 28 H.B. 975, 2019 Leg., 88th Sess. (Fla. 2019) (“An act relating to aircraft 
liens; amending [sections] 329.41 and 329.51 specifying that a lienor is not re-
quired to possess an aircraft to perfect certain liens . . . .”). 
 29 FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020). 
 30 Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting); see also CIV. 
JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 975, 1st Sess., at 4 (Fla. 2019) 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/975/Analyses/h0975z1.CJS.PDF 
(“The bill declares liens claimed under [sections] 329.41 and 713.58 for labor, 
services, fuel, or material furnished to an aircraft are not possessory liens. Thus, 
a person claiming such a lien does not need to keep the aircraft in his or her pos-
session to enforce the lien.”). 
 31 See infra Part II. A search of all Florida decisions arising under section 
713.58 over a 133-year period produced a modest set of cases—between twenty 
and thirty cases in all. The first decision was rendered in 1901, First National 
Bank v. Kirkby, 32 So. 881 (Fla. 1901), and the most recent was decided in 2019, 
J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc. v. Westward Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2019). Only seven of these decisions centered on section 329.51. See, 
e.g., Glob. Xtreme, Inc. v. Advanced Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 122 So. 3d 487, 491 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Just four cases examined section 329.41 in a substantive 
way, for example, Commercial Jet, Inc., and only four of the cases related to air-
craft, see for example, In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 616–18 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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for all takes aircraft outside of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien 
statute and situates the subject of aircraft liens in a legal scheme that 
comprehensively provides for the perfection and enforcement of air-
craft-specific artisan liens. In all, this Article’s relevance is greatest 
for aviation practitioners and courts adjudicating aviation liens, but 
it may also hold interest for a broader audience seeking to achieve 
efficiencies in the interpretation and application of commercial and 
secured transactions concerning mobile personal property in analo-
gous situations. 
I. PRIORITY, POSSESSION, AND PRECEDENT 
This section contextualizes the specific discussion of the posses-
sion versus notice problem for mechanic’s lien purposes within the 
broader context of how courts have struggled to fit aircraft within 
traditional notions of property law. Understanding how and why the 
law regards airplanes as an exceptional asset may help to explain 
how the dilemma of possession versus notice emerged in the first 
place. 
As an initial matter, little precedent exists so far as aircraft liens 
are concerned. Indeed, the history of security interests in aircraft is 
as brief as it is muddled. One obvious explanation for this is that, 
until relatively recently, aircraft were unimaginable or unknown—
or at least unrecognized—as a category of chattel under the law.32 
Consequently, controversies about the perfection and enforcement 
of liens against aircraft simply did not arise under the common law 
until the last century.33 In fact, airplane ownership and use presented 
no judiciable issue until the 1910s, and even then, practitioners and 
courts had to develop the subject matter of aviation lien law on a 
blank slate with, at best, reference to and reliance on imperfectly 
persuasive precedent established in other legal contexts.34 
 
 32 The earliest court opinions mentioning airplanes date back to approxi-
mately the early 1900s. See, e.g., Wright Co. v. Herrin-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597, 
597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913) (describing Orville and Wilbur Wright’s 1906 patent for 
“improvements in flying machines, or in other words, for a structure commonly 
known as an aeroplane”). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Scott, supra note 5, at 193–96; Note, Aeroplanes and Admiralty, 28 
HARV. L. REV. 200, 200 (1914). 
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In the 1914 case of Crawford Bros. No. 2, for example—possi-
bly the earliest tort case involving aircraft—a federal court declined 
to impose a maritime lien for repairs to an airplane because the judge 
was at a loss as to whether and how to characterize an airplane as a 
maritime vessel for jurisdictional purposes:35 
In view of the novelty and complexity of the ques-
tions that must necessarily arise out of this new en-
gine of transportation and commerce, it appears to 
the court that, in the absence of legislation conferring 
jurisdiction, none would obtain in this court, and that 
questions such as those raised by the libelant must be 
relegated to the common-law courts, courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction. [L]egislation is necessary for the 
regulation of air craft. They are neither of the land 
nor sea, and, not being of the sea or restricted in 
their activities to navigable waters, they are not mar-
itime.36 
The court’s uncertainty about how to extend jurisdiction to an 
asset that is “neither of the land nor sea”37 has become a hallmark of 
modern aviation law and aviation lien law specifically.38 As such, 
and in the absence of binding law, practitioners and courts fre-
quently draw from two legal frameworks, the common law and mar-
itime law.39 
First, under the common law, the maxim qui prior est tempore 
potior est jure—he who is first prior in time is prior in right (or eq-
uity)—applies to two liens of the same nature or class.40 In addition 
 
 35 See Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269, 270–71 (W.D. Wash. 1914). 
 36 Id. at 271 (emphasis added); see also Aeroplanes and Admiralty, supra 
note 34, at 200 (“There are certain considerations which lend a measure of super-
ficial plausibility to the contention that an aeroplane might be made subject to a 
maritime lien for repairs.”). 
 37 Crawford Bros., 215 F. at 271. 
 38 See, e.g., 14AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3679 (4th ed. Supp. 2020) (“The question of whether torts involv-
ing airplane crashes in navigable waters are cognizable in admiralty has plagued 
federal courts for almost as long as airplanes have been in existence.”). 
 39 See Scott, supra note 5, at 193. 
 40 Id. at 194. 
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to this time-sequence for priority, courts recognize the generally su-
perior position of the common law lien.41  
Conversely, under maritime law, priority among liens is deter-
mined in the inverse order of their creation such that later liens take 
precedence over all earlier liens.42 This ancient anomaly reflected 
two policy choices. First, “a maritime lien converts the vessel itself 
into the obligor and allows injured parties to proceed against it di-
rectly” in an in rem proceeding.43 As such, each lienor performing 
services for a vessel acquired some proprietary value in the vessel; 
he “acquires a jus in re, and becomes a sort of coproprietor in the res 
and . . . subjects his claim to the next similar line which attaches.”44 
Second, maritime law ranks the last lienor to perform services on a 
vessel as the senior lienholder because “the last beneficial service is 
the one that continues the activity of the ship as long as possible”45 
and doing so inures to the benefit of all earlier lienors.46  
In all, both the common law and maritime law are helpful for 
conceptualizing artisan’s liens applicable to aircraft, but neither 
translates precisely to aircraft liens, in large measure because the 
common law and maritime law offer divergent and “competing anal-
ogies” on important issues of lien priority, perfection, and enforce-
ment.47 
Aviation lien law thus confusingly reflects ideas from the two 
competing priority schemes posited by the common law and mari-
time traditions. Stated otherwise, aviation lien law falls somewhere 
between the maritime concept of proceeding in rem and the common 
law’s recognition of the superior position of the artisan who files his 
claim first in time. Notwithstanding that common law liens and 
 
 41 See id. 
 42 Id. at 194–95. 
 43 Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 44 The William Leishear, 21 F.2d 862, 863 (D. Md. 1927). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. (“[B]eneficial additions subsequent to earlier liens add to the value of 
the ship, and that, therefore, to prefer such additions will not deprive the earlier 
lienors of any interest which they would have had, if no such services had been 
rendered.”); see also Roger G. Connor, Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-Currents 
of Theory, 54 MICH. L. REV. 777, 779–83 (1956) (discussing “property” and “ben-
efit” theories of liens). 
 47 See Scott, supra note 5, at 193. 
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maritime lien concepts are theoretically (if not logically) impossible, 
the ideas from each are enduringly compelling given the resem-
blances between vessels and aircraft: 
Obviously, the fact that most airplanes today are 
chattels of considerable value means that long-term 
financing by mortgage or conditional sale will be 
necessary, as in the case of land purchase. Thus the 
common law priority problems involving secured 
holders and the later lienors immediately become 
pertinent. On the other hand, a similarity between the 
aircraft and the ship as a mode of conveyance will 
often mean that the same transactions which tradi-
tionally are recognized as giving a maritime lien may 
also be the basis for a lien in aircraft.48 
Indeed, both the common law and maritime law have merits as 
applied to aviation and each has retained relevance even in jurisdic-
tions in which liens are purely statutory in nature.49 This is particu-
larly so where “priority legislation with respect to the aircraft is in-
frequent and incomplete, so that resort to these or other principles 
outside the statute may well be necessary.”50 In all, while reflecting 
generally on how the common law and maritime law approach the 
issue of lien priority may not squarely resolve issues unique to air-
planes, it helpfully illustrates and explains the paradoxical strands 
that inform modern aircraft lien laws. 
So, too, does an understanding of the ways in which the common 
law and maritime law address the issue of possession provide im-
portant background about the policy decisions underlying contem-
porary aviation lien laws. After all, before a lienor can claim priority 
he must perfect his lien.51 Possession is the traditional mechanism.52 
Yet, in this regard, too, the common law and maritime law diverge. 
Liens at common law conferred “the mere right to retain possession 
of some chattel until a debt or demand due the person thus retaining 
 
 48 Id. at 196. 
 49 Id. at 193. 
 50 Id. at 194. 
 51 See 68A AM. JUR. 2D. Secured Transactions § 216 (2021). 
 52 See id. § 336 (describing perfection by possession under Uniform Com-
mercial Code). 
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it is satisfied; possession being such a necessary element that if it is 
voluntarily surrendered by the creditor the lien is at once extin-
guished.”53 Maritime law advances a different rule: liens may exist 
without possession of the thing upon which it is asserted, either ac-
tually or constructively.54 The aviation lien laws of every state fall 
within one or the other of these philosophies—and sometimes, 
somehow, both.55 
The crucial importance of possession in the context of aviation 
liens is explicable—obvious, even—given the mobility of airplanes 
and the relatively easy transferability of airplane parts like engines 
and avionics on a global scale.56 Airplanes often are flown to other 
states for repair, storage, and maintenance and the risk that a debtor 
might abscond with collateral is not merely hypothetical.57 The 
chance that a debtor will fly an airplane beyond the jurisdiction of a 
court authorized to issue a judgment of foreclosure, or out of the 
reach of financiers, lessors, owners, and creditors seeking reposses-
sion, clouds nearly every aviation lien foreclosure case, moreover.58 
This perhaps explains the draw of shows like Discovery Channel’s 
Airplane Repo, which dramatized bank repossessions of high-end 
luxury assets from individuals behind on their payments.59 
In any case, the flight risks inherent in aviation both mitigate for 
and against lien regimes that confer lienors with possessory rights. 
 
 53 Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127, 129 (Fla. 1925). 
 54 The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867); see also The 
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 598 (1874) (“[C]ommon-law liens are al-
ways connected with the possession of the thing and are lost when the possession 
is relinquished. On the other hand a maritime lien does not in any manner depend 
upon the possession, as it is a right affecting the thing itself, which gives a propri-
etary interest in it and a right to proceed against it to recover that interest.”). 
 55 See infra Appendix. 
 56 See supra, note 14. 
 57 The flight risk of mobile aviation assets is significant enough that, in 2001, 
some seventy-seven nations as well as the European Union signed an international 
treaty and legal framework—the “Cape Town Convention”—to standardize trans-
actions and registration of movable property. See Convention on International In-
terests in Mobile Equipment, supra note 14, at art. 3. 
 58 Florida law does recognize the risk of unlawful removal of property upon 
which a lien has accrued in other contexts, including liens for hotels. See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. § 713.69 (2020). 
 59 Airplane Repo, DISCOVERY, https://www.discovery.com/shows/airplane-
repo (last visited May 15, 2021). 
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For example, normatively, the law should disallow any possessory 
rights in favor of a lienor whose claim is based on an inflated, fraud-
ulent, or otherwise materially defective invoice.60 Oppositely, by al-
lowing a legitimately aggrieved lienor to retain possession of a 
debtor’s airplane for some amount of time, the law creates appropri-
ate leverage for an artisan and incentives for a debtor to resolve their 
dispute.61 But, of course, knowing whether a creditor rightly con-
tested or refused to pay an artisan for labor or services or whether a 
lienor was jilted by an unsavory airplane owner cannot be known 
ahead of time. All this said, allowing a creditor to take back posses-
sion of its aircraft may encourage the settlement of any debt by al-
lowing the creditor to put its aircraft back into revenue-generating 
service. 
In the foregoing context, Florida law has tried to achieve a bal-
ance by allowing a lienor under Florida’s general mechanic’s lien 
statute (section 713.58) to retain possession of an aircraft for three 
months “if the person was in possession at the time the lien at-
tached.”62 At the same time, the enforceability of a mechanic’s lien 
seems to turn not on possession but merely on whether a lienor has 
provided notice of his claim of lien.63 Whether to perfect an aviation 
lien by way of possession, or notice, or both, has confounded courts 
and practitioners for at least a decade.64 The following Part ad-
dresses the tortured way in which litigants and courts have addressed 
this question and how the Legislature resolved it (mostly). 
II. POSSESSORY LIEN + NOTICE = PERFECTION? 
Perfecting and enforcing a lien on an aircraft under Florida law 
is sometimes a complicated mess. To do so, practitioners must har-
monize at least four different statutory chapters that do not cohe-
sively relate to the state’s various mechanic’s lien statutes.65 
 
 60 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 713.31 (2020) (remedies in case of fraud or collu-
sion). 
 61 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020) (addressing retention of posses-
sion of property that has a lien attached). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020). 
 64 See infra Part II. 
 65 See FLA. STAT. chs. 78, 85, 329, 713 (2020). 
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Additionally, federal law establishes notice and recording require-
ments for aircraft liens that are themselves rift with pitfalls.66 And, 
even if all of the elements for perfection at the state and federal level 
are satisfied with absolute precision and coordination, Florida law 
provides no fewer than five methods for enforcement, including an 
action in chancery, an action at law, a special action at law, a sum-
mary action, and retention of possession.67 
Be that as it may, Title XL of the Florida Statutes is the starting 
point for creditors prosecuting a lien.68 Relating to real and personal 
property, it sets out the state’s general statutory framework for 
liens.69 It does so in four parts, each of which corresponds to a par-
ticular category of lien.70 For example, Part I is known as Florida’s 
Construction Lien Law.71 While that law is not free from ambiguity 
or controversy, it nevertheless presents substantial guidance for lien-
ors.72 Set out across more than thirty discrete statutory sections, 
Florida’s Construction Lien Law details nearly every aspect of how 
to perfect and enforce a construction lien—from how to commence 
and terminate a lien to how to assign, waive, or release a construc-
tion lien, and even how to seek attorneys’ fees in an action to enforce 
a construction lien or to enforce a claim against a bond.73 
In contrast, guidance for aviation liens is comparatively bare-
boned, coming in the form of Part II of Title XL of the Florida Stat-
utes—a catch-all statutory section entitled “Miscellaneous Liens.”74 
Under this heading are an unrelated assortment of liens, including 
 
 66 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–08. 
 67 FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020). 
 68 See FLA. STAT. chs. 689–723 (2020). 
 69 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 713 (2020) (entitled “Liens, generally”). 
 70 See id. (including the following parts: Construction Liens, Miscellaneous 
Liens, Oil and Gas Liens, and the Florida Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act). 
 71 FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001–.37 (2020). 
 72 E.g., Leonard Klingen, Florida’s Unwieldy but Effective Construction Lien 
Law, 93 FLA. BAR J. 27, 27 (2019) (“Construction liens are certainly among the 
most common. They are also among the most Byzantine, and the complexity of 
their governing statute, Part I of Chapter 713, is testament to the difficulty of bal-
ancing common law contract principles with the realities of the construction mar-
ketplace.”). 
 73 See FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001–.37 (2020). 
 74 FLA. STAT. §§ 713.50–.79.l (2020). 
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molder’s liens,75 liens for labor or services in ginning cotton,76 liens 
related to animal feed and veterinarians,77 and liens for hotels78 and 
interior decorators.79 Part II does not address aviation liens specifi-
cally. Rather, aviation practitioners have prosecuted and defended 
mechanic’s liens on the basis of the broad language of section 
713.58, Florida Statutes, which affords a lien “[i]n favor of persons 
performing labor or services for any other person, upon the personal 
property of the latter upon which the labor or services is per-
formed.”80 
Importantly, case law has universally construed liens created un-
der section 713.58, Florida Statutes,  as possessory in nature, exist-
ing only as long as the person entitled to the lien retains possession 
of the property upon which the lien was claimed.81 As Florida’s 
Third District Court of Appeal stated in an aviation lien foreclosure 
action, this statute explicitly provides that “the possessory right and 
lien of the person performing labor or services under this section is 
released, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such property.”82 
Florida statutory law also explicitly prescribes “retention of pos-
session” as condition of enforcement of a section 713.58 mechanic’s 
lien.83 Specifically, section 85.011, Florida Statutes, allows a lienor 
who furnishes labor, services, fuel, or material upon aircraft to retain 
possession of an aircraft upon which a lien has accrued for three 
 
 75 FLA. STAT. § 713.596 (2020). 
 76 FLA. STAT. § 713.595 (2020). 
 77 FLA. STAT. §§ 713.655–.66 (2020). 
 78 FLA. STAT. §§ 1713.67–68 (2020). 
 79 FLA. STAT. § 713.79 (2020). 
 80 FLA. STAT. § 713.58(1) (2020). 
 81 Despite its obvious importance, “[p]ossessory lien” is defined only once in 
the Florida Statutes, under the state’s adaption of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Section 679.333 addresses the perfection of certain liens arising by operation of 
law and defines “possessory lien” to mean “an interest . . . [w]hich secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with re-
spect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s busi-
ness[,] . . . [w]hich is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person[,] 
and . . . [t]he effectiveness of which depends on the person’s possession of the 
goods.” FLA. STAT. § 679.333 (2020) (emphasis added). 
 82 See Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)). 
 83 FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020). 
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months.84 Crucially, however, under the plain terms of this statute, 
a repairman’s right to so retain possession exists only “if the [lienor] 
was in possession [of the aircraft] at the time the lien attached.”85 
Curiously, whereas the perfection and enforcement of Florida’s 
general law concerning liens over personal property under sections 
85.011 and 713.58, Florida Statutes, turn on possession (albeit only 
for three months), the statutory regime tailored explicitly to aviation 
liens (Title XXV of the Florida Statutes) identifies notice, not pos-
session, as the sine que non of lien perfection.86 In fact, section 
329.51, Florida Statutes, titled “Liens for labor, services, fuel, or 
material expended upon aircraft; notice,” provides that an aircraft 
lien is enforceable upon the recordation of a claim of lien within 
ninety days of the services rendered: “Any lien claimed on an air-
craft under . . . [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the lienor rec-
ords a verified lien notice with the clerk of the circuit court in the 
county where the aircraft was located at the time the labor, services, 
fuel, or material was last furnished.”87 Thus, apart from its reference 
to Florida’s possessory mechanic’s lien under section 713.58—a 
reference that has generated enormous confusion—the concept of 
possession is noticeably absent from section 329.51. 
For that matter, section 329.51 contemplates a two-step process 
to perfect a lien—neither of which requires possession.88 First, the 
statute requires a lienor to file a verified notice of lien with the clerk 
of the circuit court in the county in which the aircraft was located at 
the time the labor, services, fuel, or material was last furnished in 
order for the lien to be enforceable against the owner of the 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id; see also Ocala Foundry & Mach. Works v. Lester, 38 So. 51, 54 (Fla. 
1905) (“[The mechanic’s right to retain possession] was not the rule of the com-
mon law, but it is the rule under the statute, which expressly limits the right of 
possession to a period not exceeding three months.”). Therefore, “when posses-
sion has been held for a period of three months the mechanic or laborer has no 
right under the statute to longer retain the property as against the consent of the 
debtor.” Id.; see also Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Ross, 465 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985) (reiterating the language in Ocala Foundry); E. Airlines Emps. 
Fed. Credit Union v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, Inc., 334 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1976) (relying on language of section 713.58). 
 86 See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
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aircraft.89 Second, pursuant to section 329.01,Florida Statutes (“Re-
cording instruments affecting civil aircraft”), a lienor is required to 
record notice of its lien in the office of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istrator of the United States: 
No instrument which affects the title to or interest in 
any civil aircraft of the United States, or any portion 
thereof, is valid in respect to such aircraft, or portion 
thereof, against any person, other than the person by 
whom the instrument is made or given, the person’s 
heirs or devisee, and any person having actual notice 
thereof, until such instrument is recorded in the of-
fice of the Federal Aviation Administrator of the 
United States, or such other office as is designated by 
the laws of the United States as the one in which such 
instruments should be filed. Every such instrument 
so recorded in such office is valid as to all persons 
without further recordation in any office of this state. 
Any instrument required to be recorded by the provi-
sions of this section takes effect from the date of its 
recordation and not from the date of its execution. 90 
Federal law thus works in tandem with Florida lien law. Pursu-
ant to 49 U.S.C. § 44108, until an instrument executed for security 
purposes is filed for recording with the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (“FAA”), the instrument is valid only against the person 
making the instrument and not against any other person or entity.91 
In this regard, the determination of enforceability of a mechanic’s 
lien under Florida law is distinct from the determination of validity 
 
 89 Id. The statute requires a lienor to record such lien notice within ninety 
days after the time labor, services, fuel, or material was last furnished. Id. In ad-
dition, the statute mandates that the notice of lien contains certain information: 
“the name of the lienor; the name of the owner; a description of the aircraft upon 
which the lienor had expended labor, services, fuel, or material; the amount for 
which the lien was claimed; and the date the expenditure was completed.” Id. 
 90 FLA. STAT. § 329.01 (emphasis added); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–08. 
 91 See, e.g., Creston Aviation, Inc. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 900 So. 2d 727, 729, 
731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a statutory lien against an aircraft was 
unenforceable when mechanic filed notice of lien with the FAA but not in the 
county where labor or services were last performed on aircraft). 
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of the lien against third parties and the priority of the lien against 
competing lien interests: 
Therefore, once a party asserting a mechanic’s lien 
files a verified notice of lien in the county in which 
it last provided services upon an aircraft, the notice 
of lien must also be filed with the FAA in Oklahoma 
City to obtain a validly perfected security interest in 
the aircraft, enforceable not only against the owner 
but also against third parties.92 
Implementation of section 329.51 is not complicated, but the op-
erationalization of that law has been the subject of considerable un-
certainty for aviation practitioners, particularly regarding its cross-
reference to section 713.58.93 Did the Florida Legislature codify sec-
tion 329.51 as a modification of the general law concerning liens 
over personal property provided by section 713.58? If so, possession 
is unnecessary to perfect a lien, and all that a lienor must do to per-
fect a lien is to record a verified lien notice as prescribed by the stat-
ute.94 Alternatively, insofar as section 329.51 refers to enforceability 
and not perfection, the statute does not seem to create a lien right so 
much as it provides the procedures for the enforcement of rights 
arising from liens that already exist under section 713.58.95 Under 
this view, resorting to section 329.51 is unnecessary unless and until 
a repairman perfects under section 713.58 through possession. 
In all, lining up sections 85.011, 713.58, and 329.51, Florida 
Statutes, side-by-side has generated more questions than answers for 
 
 92 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 93 See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020). 
 94 See FLA. STAT. § 92.525 (2020) (verification of documents; perjury by 
false written declaration, penalty). 
 95 Section 329.51 speaks in terms of enforceability only: “Any lien claimed 
on an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the 
lienor records a verified notice . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020) (emphasis 
added). This language contrasts sharply with other Florida aviation laws that seem 
to affirmatively create lien rights. FLA. STAT. § 329.40(1) (2020) (“The governing 
body of a publicly owned and operated airport has a lien upon all aircraft landing 
upon any airport owned and operated by it for all fees and charges for the use of 
the facilities of such airport . . . .”) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020) 
(“A person who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft for 
any unpaid fuel charges . . . .”) (emphasis added)). 
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aviation and commercial lawyers as to the relationship between pos-
session and notice for purposes of perfecting a lien interest in air-
craft under Florida law. Parts III.A.–C. below identify and evaluate 
the seminal cases that tried to make sense of the possession-notice 
conundrum under Florida’s lien law with respect to aircraft. 
A. In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. 
One of the first cases to address the possession versus notice de-
bate was a Chapter 11 proceeding captioned In re Tradewinds Air-
lines, Inc,96 decided by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge and former aviator 
A. Jay Cristol.97 The case arose out of a dispute between a cargo 
airline seeking reorganization and the maintenance company it hired 
to conduct a ninety-six-month maintenance check on an A-300 air-
plane.98 The parties disagreed about whether maintenance was actu-
ally performed and whether any amount was owed; as part of the 
dispute, the maintenance company refused to return the aircraft, as-
serting a statutory mechanic’s lien under section 713.58, Florida 
Statutes.99 But the debtor-cargo airline moved to compel the turno-
ver of the aircraft, arguing that the maintenance company failed to 
perfect its lien under Florida law insofar as it had failed to timely 
file its claim of lien prior to the bankruptcy petition date.100 Judge 
Cristol agreed.101 
According to the court, the maintenance company complied with 
only one of the requirements of section 329.01, Florida Statutes.102 
That is, it filed a verified notice of lien with the clerk of the circuit 
court in the Florida county in which the aircraft received labor or 
service, but it failed to record its lien with the FAA.103 Thus, while 
the maintenance company recorded its lien in Florida before filing 
 
 96 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 615. 
 97 See Hon. A. Jay Cristol, UNIV. MIA. SCH. OF L., https://www.law.mi-
ami.edu/faculty/hon-jay-cristol (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 98 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 616–17. 
 99 Id. at 617. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 621. 
 102 See id. 
 103 Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 329.01 (2020) (“No instrument which affects the 
title to or interest in any civil aircraft of the United States . . . is valid in respect to 
such aircraft . . . until such instrument is recorded in the office of the Federal Avi-
ation Administrator of the United States.”). 
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its bankruptcy petition, it had not filed its claim of lien with the FAA 
until after the bankruptcy proceeding commenced.104 This proved 
fatal, according to Judge Cristol, because the post-petition lien with 
the FAA did not relate back to an earlier date pre-petition; conse-
quently, the lien was avoidable by virtue of being unperfected.105 
While the case did not address the concept of possession, In re 
Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. detailed the relationship between state and 
federal law respecting notice and recordation as it related to the issue 
of perfection. It confirmed that failure to both file a notice of lien in 
the proper state court and to record a notice of lien with the FAA 
doomed the rights of repairmen relying on sections 713.58 and 
329.51. 
In reaching its conclusion, however, the court sowed doubt 
about the importance of possession for lien perfection and enforce-
ment purposes.106 Judge Cristol wrote: “Possession of an aircraft is 
legally insufficient to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an aircraft 
under Florida law.”107 This language in In re Tradewinds Airlines, 
Inc. arguably seemed to give equal or greater weight to recordation 
and notice than possession for perfection purposes. Moreover, this 
lent support, at least theoretically, to the possibility that notice of a 
lien under section 329.51, Florida Statutes (a statute specifically 
dealing with aircraft liens), was more important—determinative, in 
fact—of lien perfection than the state’s general mechanic’s lien es-
tablished by section 713.58. This argument did not initially gain 
traction, but it certainly clouded matters. 
 
 104 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 621. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at 616–17, 621. The maintenance company had possession of the 
aircraft as of the bankruptcy petition date and later relinquished possession only 
because it was directed to do so—subject to certain enumerated conditions, in-
cluding the preservation of whatever lien rights it had subject to further order of 
the court determining whether its asserted liens were valid, and the extent and 
priority of such liens. Id. at 616. 
 107 Id. at 621. The maintenance company relied on Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. 
Commerce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), which allowed 
a possessory mechanic’s lien for repairs on an aircraft arising under section 713.58 
to take priority over a properly filed chattel mortgage recorded with the FAA be-
cause a statutory lien against an aircraft could be perfected through possession. 
Id. at 620. Nevertheless, Judge Cristol was “not persuaded by [Carolina’s] rea-
soning or holding, given that Carolina was decided before the Florida Legislature 
enacted [section] 329.51 in 1984.” Id. 
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B. Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A. 
Whereas In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. posited that some 
mechanism other than possession could perfect an artisan’s lien, the 
majority in Commercial Jet, Inc. emphatically rejected this idea.108 
Specifically, at issue in Commercial Jet, Inc. was whether section 
329.51 somehow modified section 713.58 by eliminating the re-
quirement that an artisan must have possession of property over 
which he asserts a lien.109 This issue arose when an aircraft mainte-
nance and repair company sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for 
more than $57,000 in connection with services it rendered on a Boe-
ing 767.110 Critically—and, as it turned out, fatally—the mainte-
nance company recorded a claim of lien for the unpaid balance 
months after it relinquished possession of the aircraft and supposed 
that notice of its lien under section 329.51 sufficed to achieve per-
fection of its interest in the aircraft.111 One year later, it sued to fore-
close on the lien.112 On these facts, the aircraft owner argued that the 
maintenance company “did not have possession of the aircraft when 
it attempted to claim a possessory lien under section 713.58 [and 
therefore could not] proceed in its attempt to foreclose on the pur-
ported lien.”113 The trial court agreed and granted summary judg-
ment.114 
The maintenance company appealed, but fared no better as the 
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order on the 
basis that section 329.51, Florida Statutes did “not create any new 
lien rights” and was “manifestly a notice statute, as is apparent by 
its title.”115 Furthermore, the state appellate court held that “section 
 
 108 See Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 887. The maintenance company sued only U.S. Bank to foreclose its 
purported mechanic’s lien because the company that sought repairs, Silver Jet, 
was in bankruptcy dissolution proceedings in England and had reverted the air-
craft back to U.S. Bank. See Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief at 2, 
Com. Jet, Inc., v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438). 
 111 Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 887–88. 
 112 Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A. at 2, Com. Jet, Inc., v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438). 
 113 Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
 114 Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888. 
 115 Id. 
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329.51 has no application here because Commercial Jet never ac-
quired a valid lien under sections 713.58 or 329.41.”116 Thus, in the 
appellate court’s view, the maintenance company should have rec-
orded its lien before it relinquished possession because recordation 
otherwise was a futile exercise without possession. 
Senior Judge Alan Schwartz dissented.117 He wrote that section 
329.51 “clearly provides that a lien for repairs on an aircraft such as 
the one in this case is perfected simply by recording a claim of lien 
within ninety days of the services rendered.”118 Additionally, Judge 
Schwartz repudiated the majority’s conclusion that section 329.51 
“did not have the effect specifically provided by the legislature.”119 
In this regard, Judge Schwartz characterized the majority’s opinion 
as follows: 
The majority holding . . . is in conflict with just 
about every canon of legislative interpretation there 
is, including: that statutory words must be accorded 
their plain meaning; that every statute must be 
deemed to have some meaning and accomplish 
something (here, the court’s ruling renders the filing 
of the lien of no effect whatever); that a statute deal-
ing with a specific subject, such as aircraft, must be 
deemed to control over a general one such as section 
713.58, which applies to all personal property, and 
no doubt other general rules which no one has 
thought it necessary to devise—until now.120 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). 
 118 Id. (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion, but later discharged jurisdiction (as “improvidently granted”) and dismissed 
the review proceeding. Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913, 913 (Fla. 
2011) (mem.). In its jurisdictional brief, counsel for the lienor largely recycled the 
points raised by the dissent while counsel for the aircraft owner explained that the 
opinion neither conflicted with earlier appellate decisions nor involved facts sub-
stantially similar to those found in earlier decisions, and therefore, no basis for 
invoking conflict jurisdiction existed. Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s, Jurisdic-
tional Brief at 4, Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. 
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Curiously indeed, in reaching its conclusion, the Commercial 
Jet, Inc. court relied on subsection (3) of section 713.58—and only 
this statutory subpart of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute—
for the specific proposition that a repairman’s right to claim a me-
chanic’s lien over an aircraft is “extinguished when he relinquishes 
possession of the property on which the lien is asserted.”121 Subsec-
tion (3) states: 
In that the possessory right and lien of the person per-
forming labor or services under this section is re-
leased, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such 
property upon which a lien has accrued, it shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence of intent to defraud if, 
upon the removal of such property, the person re-
moving such property utters, delivers, or gives any 
check, draft, or written order for the payment of 
money in payment of the indebtedness secured by the 
lien and then stops payment on such check, draft, or 
written order.122 
Although this statutory subsection is focused on misconduct that 
causes a lienor to involuntarily lose possession of the personal prop-
erty over which a lien is asserted,123 the aircraft owner in Commer-
cial Jet, Inc. argued that “[b]y the plain terms of subpart (3) [a me-
chanic’s lien] is ‘released’ and ‘relinquished’ and ‘lost’ upon ‘the 
removal of such property.’”124  
 Thus, according to the aircraft owner, “[w]hen [the repair-
man in the case] released the aircraft, by the plain language of sec-
tion 713.58(3), it ‘released’ and ‘relinquished’ and ‘lost’ its posses-
sory lien. No lien, no resort to section 329.51.”125 The court’s 
 
SC10-2438); Respondent’s Brief on Jurisdiction at 5–6, 8, Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438). 
 121 See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (majority opinion). 
 122 FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 123 See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 713.58(4) (“Any person violating the provi-
sions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction 
shall be punished by fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more than [three] months.”). 
 124 Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 10 (quot-
ing FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)). 
 125 Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)). 
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acceptance of this reading of the first clause of 713.58(3), as estab-
lishing—not just confirming—the possessory nature of mechanic’s 
liens in Florida, is not altogether objectionable given the odd fact 
that no other part of Florida statutory law directly or clearly says “no 
possession, no lien.” 
What drew an objection, however, was a construction of subpart 
713.58(3) that somehow relegated section 329.51—and the filing of 
a lien required under its terms—of no effect. The repairman in Com-
mercial Jet, Inc., acknowledged subsection (3) and the strict depend-
ence between perfection and possession to which it alluded.126 But, 
the lienor also argued that the court was still compelled to read the 
state’s general mechanic’s lien laws in conjunction with Florida’s 
standalone law that specifically discussed aircraft liens.127 It argued, 
“the courts have caught upon the provision in §713.58(3) . . . [and] 
there is a line of cases providing that §713.58 . . . is a possessory 
lien. However, had the legislature been satisfied with the courts’ in-
terpretation . . . there would have been no new need to create 
§329.51.”128  
The Commercial Jet, Inc. court disagreed, however, drawing 
from the fact that 713.58(3) “expressly provides that ‘the possessory 
right and lien of the person performing labor or services under this 
section is released, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such 
property’” to conclude that “there is no question that the lien right 
afforded by section 713.58 is possessory in nature and that a repair-
man’s right to claim a lien under section 713.58 is extinguished 
when he relinquishes possession of the property on which the lien is 
asserted.”129 
The court was seemingly reassured of its conclusion by the cu-
rious cross-reference in section 329.51 to “[a]ny lien claimed on an 
aircraft under . . . [section] 713.58.”130 The court thus characterized 
the relationship between sections 713.58 and 329.51 in terms of tim-
ing: “Section 329.51 details how, once a fuel or service provider 
 
 126 See Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief at 9, Com. Jet, Inc., v. 
U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438). 
 127 See id. at 8–9. 
 128 Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
 129 Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)). 
 130 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2009)). 
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acquires a lien on an aircraft pursuant to section . . . 713.58, he may 
perfect his lien and establish priority of enforcement as it relates to 
third parties.”131 In doing so, the court did not bridge the concept 
that Florida law required possession for general mechanic’s lien per-
fection purposes, on the one hand, with the state law’s separate stat-
utory provision for the manner and method for the perfection of me-
chanic’s liens applicable to aircraft, on the other hand. Rather, the 
court held up one statute, section 713.58, over another, section 
329.51. And, in emphasizing the possessory nature of mechanic’s 
liens (which no party disputed), minimizing section 329.51 to noth-
ing more than a notice statute (a proposition based only on the word 
“notice” in section 329.51’s title and about which judges on the 
court and the parties disagreed), and conditioning the application of 
section 329.51 on physical possession and perfection under section 
713.58 (a requirement established nowhere explicitly in the text of 
either statute), the court’s judgment raised more questions than it 
answered. 
What is more, the court’s minimal case law analysis belied its 
certitude that “the statute expressly provides” that mechanic’s liens 
on aircraft were categorically possessory in nature and that section 
329.51 “does not create any new lien rights”132 and “is manifestly a 
 
 131 Id. (emphasis added). 
 132 Id. This conclusion apparently arose from argument that the then enacted 
version of section 329.51 did not grant a lien right but merely set forth the proce-
dure by which persons claiming liens may perfect claims of lien. See Answer Brief 
of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 13. “By its plain language,” 
the argument goes, “section 329.51 assumes a lien is in place.” Id. at 12. 
Indeed, whereas section 329.51 provides that “[a]ny lien claimed on an air-
craft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the lienor 
records a verified lien notice,” section 329.41 provides that “[a] person who has 
furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft.” FLA. STAT. §§ 329.51, 
329.41 (2020) (emphasis added). Relatedly, great variation exists among the var-
ious statutes that purport to create liens in Part II of Chapter 713 (“Liens, Gener-
ally”). Section 713.50, Florida Statutes, begins Part II by providing that 
“[l]iens . . . shall exist in favor of the following persons,” followed by approxi-
mately twenty-five statutory provisions in Part II, of which fifteen simply discuss 
liens “in favor of” particular kinds of artisans. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.56, 713.57, 
713.58, 713.59, 713.60, 713.61, 713.62, 713.63, 713.64, 713.65, 713.655, 713.66, 
713.67, 713.68, 713.70 (2020). Six more explicitly provide that “[a] lien . . . shall 
exist” or use words of similar import. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.595, 713.77, 713.596, 
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notice statute, as is apparent from its title.”133 In fact, the court pro-
vided only a string citation of four cases—all of which confirmed 
what was already known and undisputed (e.g., that general me-
chanic’s liens are possessory in nature), and none of which analyzed 
the material issue of whether Florida lawmakers intended to allow 
lienors of aircraft an alternative mechanism for perfecting liens.134 
Two of these decisions had nothing to do with airplanes, for ex-
ample, and arose in factually inapposite circumstances. First, State 
v. Miller involved the claim of an automobile repairman who was 
arrested after failing to surrender possession of a car even after its 
owner posted a bond in compliance with a state statute that required 
repairmen to release the vehicle on the owner’s filing of a bond to 
recover repair costs.135 The repairman in Miller challenged the stat-
ute as an unconstitutional deprivation of his property right without 
due process of the law.136 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected 
this claim, holding that the statute struck a “constitutional balance 
between the interests of a person in the use and possession of his 
property and the interests of a laborer in the existence of secure col-
lateral commensurate with the value of his services.”137 While Mil-
ler aptly articulated the balance of interests that is always at issue in 
the context of liens, it provided no clarity about how sections 713.58 
and 329.51 worked together (or not). 
Another case cited by the Commercial Jet, Inc. court—Archive 
America, Inc. v. Variety Children’s Hospital138—likewise added no 
insight about how to reconcile Florida’s notice and possession stat-
utes for aircraft lien purposes. The Commercial Jet, Inc. court did 
 
713.78, 713.785, 713.79 (2020). One states that “[t]he holder of a license . . . has 
and may enforce . . . a lien.” FLA. STAT. § 713.665 (2020); see also FLA. STAT. 
§ 713.691 (2020). One provides “held to have given . . . a statutory lien of prior 
dignity to all other encumbrances.” FLA. STAT. § 713.71 (2020). Finally, one pro-
vides that “[a] person claiming a lien under [section] 713.58 for performing labor 
or services on a motor vehicle may enforce such lien by sale.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 713.585 (2020). 
 133 See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888. 
 134 See id. 
 135 State v. Miller, 373 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 1979). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 681. 
 138 Archive Am., Inc. v. Variety Children’s Hosp., 873 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
2021] NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA 1145 
 
not suggest otherwise, citing the case only for the proposition that it 
“referenc[ed] ‘a possessory lien established by section 713.58.’”139 
That it did—in a context far removed from aviation. At issue in Ar-
chive America, Inc. was a dispute between a large warehouse that 
stored literally millions of tons of patients’ medical records and a 
hospital that sought to move the records to a competitor.140 A trial 
court transferred the warehouseman’s lien to a bond even though 
Florida law did not explicitly provide such a mechanism.141 Finding 
that this was an appropriate exercise of the trial judge’s equitable 
powers, the Archive America, Inc. court noted that the lienor’s reli-
ance on Miller—and its discussion of section 713.58 as a possessory 
lien—was misplaced.142 Again, other than, at best, establishing the 
possessory nature of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute, Ar-
chive America, Inc. did not shed light on the applicability of section 
329.51 nor demonstrate how or why section 329.51 was expressly 
or indisputably inapplicable in light of section 713.58. 
Third, the Commercial Jet, Inc. court cited Eastern Airlines Em-
ployees Federal Credit Union143 for the proposition that “a me-
chanic’s possessory lien against personal property (under a provi-
sion such as section 713.58, Florida Statutes) . . . continued as long 
as [the lienor] continued in possession thereof.”144 While this lan-
guage certainly confirmed how critical it was for artisans to maintain 
possession under Florida law’s general mechanic’s lien, the case of-
fered marginal value as to the issue of whether notice played an al-
ternative role for lien perfection purposes with respect to aircraft as 
the maintenance company in Commercial Jet, Inc. argued was ex-
plicit in section 329.51. 
Finally, the Commercial Jet, Inc. court cited In re Tradewinds 
Airlines, Inc., but not for its statement that “[p]ossession of an air-
craft is legally insufficient to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an 
 
 139 See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (quoting Archive Am., Inc., 873 So. 2d 
at 362). 
 140 Archive Am., Inc., 873 So. 2d at 360. 
 141 Id. at 361. 
 142 Id. at 362. 
 143 E. Airlines Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, Inc., 334 
So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
 144 Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (quoting E. Airlines Empls. Fed. Credit 
Union, 334 So. 2d at 177). 
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aircraft under Florida law.”145 Rather, the court cited In re 
Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. for a parenthetical citation to a single sen-
tence from a Massachusetts bankruptcy case: “Possession is the sine 
qua non of [a section 713.58] lien.”146 Standing alone, this appeared 
to support the Commercial Jet, Inc. court’s rationale and holding; 
but it was not what the Massachusetts case, In re Garland,147 de-
cided—nor did this statement influence Judge Cristol’s decision in 
In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. 
In re Garland involved the claim by a creditor to establish a me-
chanic’s lien on its debtor’s property under section 713.58.148 The 
creditor had relinquished possession of the goods over which the 
lien was asserted, but only because it was “induced to surrender pos-
session by a fraudulent promise of payment” (by check) by the 
debtor, “who knew it had no funds and was about to file a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceeding.”149 Given this, the bankruptcy court per-
mitted the creditor to proceed with a claim for an equitable lien be-
cause of the debtor’s fraudulent use of a check returned for insuffi-
cient funds.150 “Certainly in equity,” the court held, “the thief should 
not be allowed to hide behind the victim’s resulting lack of posses-
sion.”151 Thus, in citing In re Garland for a rigid proposition—that 
lien perfection is achieved only through physical possession—the 
court oversimplified the case and its equitable dimension arising in 
a factually inapposite context. 
 
 145 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 146 Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (citing In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 395 
B.R. at 622). 
 147 In re Garland Corp., 6 B.R. 452 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980). 
 148 Id. at 453. 
 149 Id. The creditor sought two statutory liens for two different amounts due. 
Id. Count I of its complaint concerned a debt of $81,932 and the remaining counts 
centered on a debt of $112,437.82. Id. The court dismissed Count I because the 
creditor had voluntarily relinquished possession of the goods at issue by stipula-
tion and so could not satisfy the possessory requirement of the statutory lien al-
lowed by section 713.58, Florida Statutes. See id. at 455. The second amount was 
tainted by the debtor’s fraud, however, and thus eligible for the imposition of an 
equitable lien in the court’s view. Id. 
 150 Id. at 455. 
 151 Id. at 456. 
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In the final analysis, possession equals perfection was the legacy 
of the decision in Commercial Jet, Inc.,152 but it did not solve the 
possession versus notice problem as a practical matter. In fact, the 
resolve of aircraft maintenance and repair providers to retain pos-
session of an aircraft upon which a lien was asserted as long as pos-
sible—even wrongfully—intensified in the wake of Commercial 
Jet, Inc., among other reasons, to avoid impairing their interests in 
an inflexible “no possession, no lien” scheme. 
C. J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc. v. Westwind Leasing Corp. 
Commercial Jet, Inc. presented turbulence in J.V. Air Mainte-
nance, Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., in which an aircraft leasing 
company refused to pay a repair bill it deemed “grossly exagger-
ated.”153 Consequently, the maintenance company sued to foreclose 
on the mechanic’s lien it filed against the aircraft while in possession 
of the aircraft.154 Additionally, the lienor retained possession of the 
aircraft beyond the three-month period authorized by section 85.011, 
Florida Statutes during which it served the aircraft’s owner with a 
notice of non-judicial sale indicating its intent to sell the aircraft at 
public auction during that period.155 The trial court cancelled the 
proposed non-judicial sale and directed the return of the aircraft, and 
the lienor appealed.156 
In a unanimous decision, the Third District Court of Appeal rec-
ognized the repair company’s concern that the holding of Commer-
cial Jet, Inc. “will cause the loss of its lien if the property is returned 
 
 152 See Global Xtreme, Inc. v. Advanced Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 122 So. 3d 487, 
491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“Section 329.51 is a notice statute that applies to 
liens claimed on an aircraft. Neither section 713.58 nor section 329.51 provides 
for attorney’s fees.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010))); US Acquisition, LLC v. 
Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller & Brown, P.A., 87 So. 3d 1229, 1232–33 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that a law firm’s charging lien for fees arising from 
an aircraft replevin action was possessory in nature and unperfected because it 
was not filed with the FAA); Signia Jets, L.L.C. v. N75GA, Ltd., No. CACE 14–
017628, 2017 WL 5201105 at *2, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding no posses-
sion and therefore no encumbrance against the aircraft). 
 153 J.V. Air Maint., Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379, 379 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
 154 Id. at 379–80. 
 155 Id. at 380. 
 156 Id. 
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under section 85.011,” but declined to read the case so broadly.157 
Rather, the court contrasted the circumstances in Commercial Jet, 
Inc., where the lienor voluntarily relinquished possession before 
perfection, with the question before it: namely, whether a perfected 
lien lapses when a lienor is required to return the property at the end 
of the three months provided in section 85.011.158 The court noted 
that “[t]he length of time the lien remains valid should not be con-
fused with the length of time that a lienor has the right to possess the 
property.”159 
The court also minimized as “obiter dicta” the language in sev-
eral other cases to the effect that a mechanic’s lien expires when 
possession is lost.160 In doing so, the court claimed to have avoided 
conflict with cases holding to the contrary, including long-standing 
precedent expressly stating that a person asserting a mechanic’s lien 
does not lose its lien when it is forced to surrender possession after 
three months statutory period.161 And, although not crucial to its rul-
ing, the court offered a somewhat linear and cohesive approach for 
artisans to follow in pursuing a mechanic’s lien under Florida law 
with respect to aircraft, stating: 
 Under the 2017 version of section 329.51 [and 
Commercial Jet, Inc.], a lienor must have posses-
sion of the property at issue to perfect a lien. 
 One of the five statutory methods to enforce the 
lien is to retain possession for three months. 
 If by purported payment, the owner induces the 
lienor to surrender both possession and its lien, 
but then cancels payment, those circumstances 
are prima facie proof of fraudulent intent. 
 
 157 Id. at 381. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 382. 
 161 Id. at 381 (citing Ocala Foundry & Mach. Works v. Lester, 38 So. 51, 54 
(Fla. 1905)). 
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 If the owner fails to seek return of the property at 
the end of the three-month period, the lienor may 
sell the property. 
 But if the owner demands possession at the end 
of the three months, the lienor is forced to return 
the property, although its lien continues. . . . 
 Moreover, additional remedies are provided to “a 
person entitled to a lien under part II of chapter 
713.” These include a lienor’s ability in certain 
circumstances to attach the property in aid of 
foreclosure. A lienor may do so if it “has reason 
to believe, and does believe, that . . . the property 
or part of it will be removed beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court,” subject to bonding and poten-
tial liability for a wrongful attachment.162 
This provided a prospectively useful checklist for practitioners and 
courts to follow for aircraft mechanic’s liens, but it left open a num-
ber of issues. First, the court directly acknowledged that it did not 
address “the rights of the lienor against third parties who may ac-
quire an interest in the property without actual or constructive notice 
of the lien [because] those issues . . . are not before us.”163 Second, 
and perhaps most important, the J.V. Air Maintenance., Inc. decision 
applied the 2017 version of 329.51, which the Florida Legislature 
amended in 2019 to include the following sentence: “The lienor is 
not required to possess the aircraft to perfect such a lien.”164 
 
 162 Id. at 382–83 (citations omitted). 
 163 Id. at 383. 
 164 Id. at 380 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2019)) (noting that newly 
added statutory language did not impact its analysis). The Legislature also 
amended section 329.41 (“Lien for fuel furnished to aircraft”), which now pro-
vides: “A person who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft 
for any unpaid fuel charges, and possession of the aircraft is not required in order 
to perfect such lien. The lien is enforceable in the same manner as provided in 
[section] 329.51.” FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020) (emphasis added). The legislation 
effecting these changes “does not affect the possessory nature of liens for labor or 
services to other property claimed under [section 713.58] [for labor or services 
performed on motor vehicles], or liens for landing claimed under [section 329.40]. 
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Having examined the body of Florida case law respecting me-
chanic’s liens over aircraft, this Article now focuses on the current 
state of mechanic’s liens in Florida as applied to aircraft and orients 
the laws of Florida with respect to similar laws across the United 
States. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Florida Legislature’s amendment of section 329.51 in 2019 
by and large brought to an end the challenge of divining whether, 
when, if, and how Florida’s possessory mechanic’s lien statute un-
der section 713.58 operates alongside the state’s aviation-specific 
statutory framework that requires only notice for purposes of lien 
perfection. Effective July 1, 2019,165 and prospective in its applica-
tion,166 aviation law practitioners now have a clearer path toward 
perfecting an aircraft lien. Stated otherwise, Judge Schwartz was 
right; too bad for the maintenance company in Commercial Jet, 
Inc.—it would have prevailed a decade ago under the same facts had 
the current statutory scheme existed. That said, the fact that the out-
come in Commercial Jet, Inc. could change so drastically on the 
mere basis of a sentence eliminating possession as a condition of 
perfection contextualizes the interpretative difficulties that section 
329.51 has presented. 
But a more useful question to evaluate than merely whether ex-
isting Florida law does or does not favor possession or notice for 
lien perfection purposes as a matter of law (there is no question that 
notice alone is now sufficient) is perhaps how to best balance the 
rights of artisans and aircraft owners and users in a scheme that 
makes allowances on both sides of the debate rather tilts the legal 
landscape toward one side over another. In this context, this Part: 
 
These liens remain possessory liens unless categorized otherwise in statute.” CIV. 
JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4. 
 165 CIV. JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4. 
 166 E.g., Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, 67 So. 3d 187, 
195 (Fla. 2011) (“We again set forth the two-prong test for retroactivity: ‘First, 
the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply 
retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must deter-
mine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional princi-
ples.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Menendez v. Progressive Express Ins., 
35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010))). 
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(1) situates Florida’s “new” aircraft mechanic’s lien statute within 
the national landscape of aircraft liens; (2) evaluates the incentives 
and disincentives that a notice-only lien scheme creates; and (3) ar-
gues in favor of an omnibus statute that both decouples Florida’s 
stand-alone aviation statutory laws from the state’s general statutory 
scheme for mechanic’s liens, and addresses comprehensively sev-
eral core issues that arise again and again in aircraft mechanic’s lien 
matters. 
A. Possession in Perspective 
No court in Florida that has considered the subject of aircraft 
mechanic’s liens under sections 329.51 and 713.58 has relied on the 
lien laws of other states. This is curious given the lack of clear and 
controlling precedent in the realm of aircraft lien law. What is more, 
litigants have taken different and unexpectedly inflexible positions 
about the appropriateness of looking to the lien laws of other juris-
dictions as persuasive authority. 
For example, in the course of opposing a restrictive, possession-
only reading of Florida law, the aircraft service facility in Commer-
cial Jet, Inc. argued against consideration of the requirements of 
other states with regard to perfection and enforcement of their me-
chanic’s liens: “What other states do is irrelevant when construing a 
Florida statute.”167 Yet, in the same breath, it warned (incorrectly 
and without data) that Florida would be unique among other states 
and out-of-step when it comes to other states and aircraft services if 
it declined to accept its “notice is sufficient” interpretation of section 
329.51.168 Oppositely, the aircraft owner in Commercial Jet, Inc. ar-
gued that whether Florida law fell within or without national trends 
was “easily verifiable” and that, in fact, other states required posses-
sion to perfect similar liens.169 
In this context, the Appendix to this Article comprehensively 
evaluates the mechanic’s lien laws of every state (including the 
 
 167 Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 4 (“Pol-
icy considerations are properly argued to the legislative branch to seek to create a 
new statute or modify an existing one. This Court is limited to enforcing the stat-
utes a legislature has passed.”). 
 168 See id. at 4–6; Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 
112, at 16. 
 169 Id. at 16. 
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District of Columbia), including citation of the relevant laws, how 
possession is perfected, and the operative statutory language. Doing 
so yields a number of quantitative and qualitative insights from a 
policy perspective, including that the lienor’s argument in Commer-
cial Jet, Inc.—that only Florida law mattered—was against its own 
interest given that the vast majority of jurisdictions (now including 
Florida) do not condition perfection on possession. 
To begin with, fewer than ten states expressly adapt or adhere to 
the bright-line common law rule that perfection of a mechanic’s lien 
is strictly dependent upon possession.170 Arguably, Florida is (or 
was) among these states insofar as the first clause of section 
713.58(3) articulates that a lien is “released, relinquished, or lost” 
without possession.171 In any case, whereas the possessory nature of 
Florida’s mechanic’s lien law has been a function of statutory inter-
pretation, seven states (including the District of Columbia) are un-
ambiguously explicit and express about the cruciality of possession 
for perfection purposes. These states are: California (“every person 
has a lien dependent upon possession”);172 the District of Columbia 
(“if possession is parted with by his consent such lien shall 
cease”);173 Iowa (“shall have a lien . . . while such property is law-
fully in the person’s possession”);174 Montana (“[t]he lien is depend-
ent on possession”);175 New Hampshire (“so long as the same shall 
remain in his possession”);176 Pennsylvania (“is known as a ‘com-
mon law lien’ . . . while such property is in the hand of the said per-
son”);177 and West Virginia (“while in possession thereof”).178 The 
indispensability of possession in states like Colorado, Hawaii, and 
Vermont are expressed otherwise, for example in court opinions.179 
 
 170 See infra Appendix. 
 171 FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2020). 
 172 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1208.61 (Deering 2021). 
 173 D.C. CODE § 40-307.01 (2021). 
 174 IOWA CODE § 577.1 (2021). 
 175 MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1201 (2019). 
 176 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 450:2 (2020). 
 177 6 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11 (West 2021). 
 178 W. VA. CODE § 38-11-3 (2020). 
 179 See, e.g., Wenz v. McBride, 36 P. 1105, 1106 (Colo. 1894) (“There must 
be a possession of the thing; otherwise there cannot, without special agreement to 
that effect, be any lien.”). 
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Three other states—Delaware, New York and North Carolina—
do not necessarily require possession for perfection, but the conse-
quences of relinquishing possession are unforgiving if not followed-
up by some other action. For example, in North Carolina, a lien sur-
vives “even if the possession of the aircraft is surrendered by the 
lienor,” provided that the lienor files a notice of lien with the appro-
priate court clerk within 120 days after voluntarily surrendering pos-
session of the aircraft.180 Comparatively, New York law provides 
that “if the lienor, subsequent to thirty days from the accrual of such 
lien, allows the . . . aircraft out of his actual possession the lien pro-
vided for in this section shall thereupon become void as against all 
security interests, whether or not perfected.”181 Likewise, Delaware 
requires a lienholder, “within 10 days from the time of the loss of 
possession” to “file[] an application for the issuance of an authori-
zation to conduct a lien sale or file[] a counterclaim for the sale of 
the encumbered property pursuant to this chapter in a replevin ac-
tion.”182 
Relatedly, three states (Alaska, Connecticut, and Wyoming) re-
quire an artisan to file a lien statement before relinquishing posses-
sion—akin to the reading of section 329.51 recognized in Commer-
cial Jet, Inc.183 Six other states are less rigid in that they require ar-
tisans to file or record a claim of lien but allow them to do so if and 
after they relinquish possession. This is the case in Arizona,184 Ar-
kansas,185 Georgia,186 Kansas,187 Kentucky,188 and Missouri.189 
Whether to include these nine states under the heading of “no pos-
session, no lien”—along with states that do not require possession 
for perfection, but which void a lien once possession is relinquished 
(e.g., Delaware, New York, and North Carolina)—is more art than 
 
 180 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-55 to -60 (2020). 
 181 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 184 (McKinney 2021). 
 182 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3901–3902 (2020). 
 183 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.35.185 (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 49-92g (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102 (West 2020). 
 184 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1022 (2021). 
 185 ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-45-206 (2020). 
 186 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-363 (2020). 
 187 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3122 (2020). 
 188 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.270 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 189 MO. REV. STAT. § 430.020 (2020). 
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science. For that matter, three states (Alabama,190 Idaho,191 and Or-
egon192) ostensibly recognize both possessory and non-possessory 
mechanic’s liens. 
Suffice it to say that tabulating the number of “no possession, no 
lien” states lacks total precision, but one trend is clear: maintaining 
possession for as long as legally possible is a wise if not imperative 
strategy in nineteen states (including the District of Columbia), 
which as a unit constitute a minority position. The vast majority of 
states, on the other hand, require only the recordation or filing of a 
claim to perfect a lien. To be clear, each of these “notice-only” states 
allows lienholders to retain possession (often until the debt is fully 
paid), but seem indifferent to whether a lienor voluntarily loses or 
relinquishes possession.193 For that matter, “notice-only” jurisdic-
tions seem not to care if the lienor ever had and then lost possession 
for perfection purposes. Pursuant to the recent amendment to section 
329.51, Florida now falls within this “notice-only” rubric where a 
lienor has the option of maintaining possession for up to ninety days 
and the obligation to file a notice in order to perfect a lien.194 Florida 
joins twenty-five other states in so providing. 
Altogether, possession is an explicit feature (but not a require-
ment) of nearly every general mechanic’s lien and specific aircraft 
lien law in the country.195 As mentioned, some state laws, like those 
of California, strictly mandate possession to perfect a lien.196 The 
only imperative for perfection in other states, however, is the filing 
of claim of lien without which no lien exists (e.g., Massachusetts 
(“Unless the person entitled to such lien shall file such statement 
 
 190 ALA. CODE § 35-11-110 (2021); see also Peavy’s Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Assocs. 
Fin. Servs. Co., 335 So. 2d 169, 170–71 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (“Alabama is one 
of the states which provides two mechanic’s liens . . . . [T]he statutory mechanic’s 
lien . . . merely supplements, not supplants, the common law mechanic’s lien. The 
common law lien is a possessory lien and is lost by release of the property. The 
statutory lien is not dependent upon maintaining possession, but may be perfected 
after release of the property.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 191 IDAHO CODE § 45-1101 (2020). 
 192 OR. REV. STAT. § 87.152 (2020) (possessory); id. § 87.216 (non-posses-
sory). 
 193 See infra Appendix. 
 194 FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020). 
 195 See infra Appendix. 
 196 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1208.61 (Deering 2021). 
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within the time aforesaid, he shall be deemed to have waive his 
rights thereto . . . .”)197 and South Carolina (“[Aircraft liens] shall be 
dissolved unless the person claiming it shall file . . . .”)198). Between 
these two poles—perfection strictly dependent upon possession and 
perfection by notice or filing only—are a number of alternative ap-
proaches, summarized as follows: 
 
 No Possession. No Lien. Nine states, plus the District of 
Columbia, provide that perfection is strictly dependent 
upon possession and they all do so explicitly: California, 
Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Vir-
ginia. Section 713.58(3) does this in Florida, too. 
 
 Filing While in Possession: Three states (Alaska, Con-
necticut, and Wyoming) require that lienholders file a 
lien statement with the relevant authorities before relin-
quishing possession. This was Florida’s approach ac-
cording to the Commercial Jet, Inc. court. 
 
 Filing After Relinquishing Possession. Six states man-
date that lienors record and file a claim of lien within a 
set number of days (x) after relinquishing possession, 
with one month being the least amount of time and six 
months being the most: Arizona (30), Arkansas (120), 
Georgia (90), Kansas (90), Kentucky (180), and Mis-
souri (180). Delaware, New York, and North Carolina do 
not explicitly condition perfection on possession, but 
they provide that a mechanic’s lien will be void if pos-
session is relinquished (thirty days in the case of New 
York and 120 days in the case of North Carolina). Dela-
ware law, meanwhile, states that a lien will continue in 
full force and effect “provided that within 10 days from 
the time of the loss of possession the lienholder . . . files 
an application for the issuance of an authorization to con-
duct a lien sale or files a counterclaim for the sale of the 
 
 197 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255, §31E (2019). 
 198 S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-15-100 (2020). 
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encumbered property . . . in a replevin action.” This ap-
proach was rejected in Commercial Jet, Inc. 
 
 Notice (or Filing) Only. Twenty-six states allow lienors 
to retain possession (albeit for a limited amount of time, 
usually 60, 90, 120, or 180 days), but condition perfec-
tion on the filing or recording of a claim of lien only: 
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wis-
consin. One state, Nebraska, provides that liens are per-
fected as provided in Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. 
 
 Possession and/or Non-possession. Three states provide 
both a possessory and non-possessory lien. Alabama, for 
example, recognizes both a common law lien dependent 
upon possession and a statutory lien that may be per-
fected after release of the property. Idaho and Oregon, 
meanwhile, recognize two types of statutory mechanics’ 
liens—one requiring possession and the other not.199 
 
By amending section 329.51 to explicitly and unambiguously 
disconnect the concepts of possession and perfection for purposes 
of a mechanic’s lien applicable to aircraft, Florida has joined the 
majority of jurisdictions where “[p]ossession of an aircraft,” in the 
language of In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., “is legally insufficient 
to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an aircraft under Florida law.”200 
Therefore, notice alone suffices, but should it? And, as a norma-
tive matter, should the Legislature have abrogated the common law 
and changed Florida’s aircraft lien laws to such a degree? The fol-
lowing sections evaluate these questions. 
 
 199 See infra Appendix; Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 200 In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R., 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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B. No Possession, No Incentive? 
The Florida Legislature amended section 329.51 to “make it eas-
ier for a lienor to recover money owed to him without keeping a 
commercial aircraft out of service and potentially disrupting com-
mercial air travel.”201 The statutory amendment also was designed 
to “allow the owner or operator of an aircraft on which a lien is 
claimed to keep using the aircraft while he works to satisfy the 
lien.”202 To be sure, these are laudable policy goals, but they leave 
unresolved a number of normative and practical questions, including 
whether the new statutory regime, by removing the leverage gained 
through a possessory lien, will disincentivize payment up front or 
promote surprise clouds on airplane title, as the aircraft owner in 
Commercial Jet, Inc. forecast.203 
Indeed, several factors mitigate in favor of a “no possession, no 
lien” regime and against a notice-only rule, as argued by the aircraft 
owner in Commercial Jet, Inc. First, the history of section 329.51 
lends credence to the argument that, apparently until now, the Leg-
islature did not intend to displace a possession-based scheme for 
possession: 
Here is the actual history. Before the enactment in 
1983 of section 329.51, the Florida Statutes did not 
set forth any procedures by which one could record a 
mechanic’s lien on an aircraft in Florida. The Federal 
Aviation Act, however, required the FAA to look to 
state law in determining the validity of claims of lien 
on aircraft that were recorded with the FAA. Because 
Florida did not have an aircraft lien recording statute, 
the FAA determined that it could no longer record 
claims of lien for labor, services, or material fur-
nished to aircraft in Florida. As a result, the Florida 
legislature enacted section 329.51 to correct that sit-
uation by providing specific requirements for record-
ing aircraft liens. The Legislature was not creating 
 
 201 CIV. JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4. The reason 
that only “commercial aircraft” and not general aviation aircraft are mentioned as 
part of the analysis is unstated. See id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 17. 
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any new lien rights. It was simply aligning Florida 
law so that existing rights under Florida law—such 
as possessory liens under section 713.58—could be 
recorded and recognized by the FAA.204 
This historical account went uncontested in Commercial Jet, Inc.,205 
a concession that no doubt strengthened the aircraft owner’s argu-
ment: 
Filing a piece of paper in Miami-Dade County re-
cording a purported lien does not get it back. And 
that is how it should be. Possessory liens require pos-
session, and the leverage of possession resolves dis-
putes over payment. Commercial Jet would have this 
Court create a new category of non-possessory “pos-
sessory liens” and permit clouds on title up to 90 days 
after services are provided. Nothing in the text or his-
tory of the statute supports that interpretation, and 
there is no reasonable policy justification in favor of 
it. [Such a] proposition will not help resolve disputes; 
it will instead create headaches for purchasers down-
stream. [An artisan] absolutely has rights against [its 
debtor]. But it has no right to spring a lien on the air-
craft’s owner merely by attempting to record a lien 
for [the debtor’s] unpaid bills. . . .206 
. . . . 
Allowing service providers to wait [ninety] days and 
then seek liens on aircraft that are routinely bought 
and sold and moved on and off leases is a recipe for 
clouded title and aggrieved bona fide purchasers. 
This case is a good illustration. Silver Jet may know 
full well that it has not paid its bill, but there was no 
way—and, quite frankly, recording in Miami-Dade 
County does not assist much—for the owner of the 
aircraft to know that title has been clouded. If the 
 
 204 Id. at 14–15 (internal citations omitted). 
 205 See Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 4. 
 206 Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 1–2. 
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aircraft is then moved to a new owner, the new owner 
likewise has no warning. Indeed, given the [ninety]-
day window that Commercial Jet thinks ought to ap-
ply, a sale could occur and then months after the 
transaction a lien could appear on the recently pur-
chased aircraft.207 
Alternatively, as asserted by the lienor in Commercial Jet, Inc., 
the common law paradigm of possession-for-perfection may just not 
work well for airplanes given that aircraft labor, service, and mate-
rial providers oftentimes do not and cannot exercise possession over 
personal property in ways that other artisans might as to other kinds 
of assets: 
Unlike [section] 713.58, which grants a general lien 
right against miscellaneous personal property, [sec-
tion 329.51] is specific to aircraft. Chapter 329 [] ad-
dresses the very different nature of aircraft as op-
posed to other personal property. First, unlike other 
personal property, when aircraft require repair, they 
often cannot be flown or towed down the street to a 
repair facility. Repairs occur wherever the aircraft 
may be located . . . . [Section 329.51] applies equally 
to large aircraft maintenance performed at a mainte-
nance facility as well as to smaller entities, often con-
sisting of only licensed mechanics who perform 
maintenance and repairs on aircraft wherever the air-
craft may be located, such as the owner’s private 
hangar or on the airport tarmac where the aircraft is 
normally parked. In the latter case, those mechanics 
are no more in possession of the aircraft than a 
roofer is in possession of the house whose roof he has 
repaired. [Section 329.51] applies in all of these sit-
uations.208 
 
 207 Id. at 8–9. 
 208 Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 8–9 (em-
phasis added). Aspects of the maintenance company’s argument invoked notes of 
maritime law:  
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Framed in this way, section 713.58 and its possessory require-
ment seem out of place as applied to airplanes, as does the concept 
that the recording imperative in section 329.51 is somehow an exer-
cise with no real benefit to lienors: 
A careful review of [Chapter 329] discloses the dif-
ference in the legislature’s treatment of the various 
lien rights. [Section 329.40], providing for a lien in 
favor of a government owned airport provides for a 
 
When Silver Jet hired Commercial Jet to perform maintenance 
and improvements upon the aircraft owned by U.S. Bank, Com-
mercial Jet improved the aircraft via its labor and materials and 
thereby increased the value of U.S. Bank’s aircraft. The aircraft 
was redelivered to Silver Jet by Commercial Jet on April 20, 
2008 and then shortly thereafter U.S. Bank cancelled the lease 
with Silver Jet and retook possession of its aircraft, an aircraft 
worth more than it would have been but for Commercial Jet’s 
work and services. That made the aircraft more valuable and 
should have assisted U.S. Bank in leasing or selling the aircraft 
thereafter. Therefore, it is clear that U.S. Bank was benefited 
as a result of the labors, services and materials rendered by 
Commercial Jet to the aircraft. It is this benefit to the owner of 
a chattel that gives rise to artisan liens. Simply put, U.S. Bank 
was benefited by the work performed by Commercial Jet and it 
is both fair and reasonable that U.S. Bank should pay for same. 
This is the result required by [section 329.51].  
Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 2–3 (emphasis 
added). The maintenance company went on to say that 
This Court must keep in mind that this statute applies not only 
to large maintenance facilities such as Commercial Jet, but also 
to aircraft mechanics throughout the state who go to an aircraft 
owner or operator’s hangar or aircraft parking space and per-
form services on the aircraft at such locations. Those persons 
are never in possession of the aircraft. [Section 329.51] none-
theless provides them a remedy to ensure that they are paid for 
the value of their labor and the increased value in the aircraft, 
the benefits of which flow to the aircraft owner. If U.S. Bank 
wishes to argue fairness, nothing can be more fair than to allow 
persons and entities who perform services on these highly mo-
bile assets which may or may not ever be in the possession of 
the mechanic to have a remedy to ensure that the mechanic is 
paid for the materials and services provided which ultimately 
benefits no one other than the owner of the aircraft.  
Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added); see also supra Part I. 
2021] NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA 1161 
 
possessory enforcement. However, [section 329.41] 
simply provides a lien right for persons providing 
fuel to aircraft upon recording a claim of lien per 
[section 329.51] [which] then provides that persons 
claiming liens under [section 329.41] and persons 
claiming lien against an aircraft pursuant to [section 
713.58] shall have an enforceable lien if they record 
a Claim of Lien within [ninety] days. The legislature 
clearly intended that [section 329.51] provided lien 
rights without retention of possession. Had the legis-
lature intended to create a simple recording statute it 
would have said that persons claiming a lien under 
[section 329.41] or [section 713.58] must record a 
Claim of Lien within [ninety] days after the provision 
of the services. But the legislature went much farther 
than that. The legislature stated that persons claiming 
liens under those two sections have enforceable liens 
if a verified lien notice is filed with the Clerk of 
Court within [ninety] days. Any other interpretation 
would render this language a nullity and in violation 
of the tenets of statutory construction.209 
What is more: 
If the legislature wanted liens under [section 713.58] 
to exist and be enforced solely by possession, it could 
have omitted the reference to [section 713.58] here 
and left the current body of law interpreting that stat-
ute as it is. In the alternative, the legislature could 
have reinforced the existing possessory enforcement 
procedure by stating that liens under [section 713.58] 
should be enforced as provided for enforcement of 
warehouse liens, as it mentioned only two sections 
previously. 
Finally, the last sentence of [section 329.51] states 
that the section does not affect the lienor’s obligation 
to record the lien under [section 329.01]. It is clear 
 
 209 See Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 17–
18 (internal citations omitted). 
1162 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1117 
 
from this last sentence that the legislature did not in-
tend for [section 329.51] to be a mere recording stat-
ute. The recording statute is contained in [section 
329.01] clearly describes what is required to have an 
enforceable lien for either fuel furnished to an air-
craft under [section 329.41] or for materials and la-
bor provided under [section 713.58]. 
. . . [T]he legislature obviously recognized the expe-
diency with which commercial aircraft must be re-
turned to revenue generating service. This intent is 
supported by the different treatment the legislature 
gave to those who provide fuel and services to air-
craft. Large commercial aircraft generate huge 
amounts of revenue while in service. This revenue 
stream cannot be delayed while waiting to pay the 
fuel bill or waiting to find out the cost of the last mi-
nute service or overhaul of a critical component of 
the aircraft. Following the express language of [sec-
tion 329.51] allows these suppliers (fuel or mainte-
nance) to safely and immediately release the aircraft 
to revenue service without concern their lien rights 
will be lost.210 
In the final analysis, advocates and opponents of the “no posses-
sion, no lien” and “notice-only” camps both raised compelling 
points, invoking the phrase “half a dozen of one, six of the other.” 
Neither position is obviously superior. Moreover, though both claim 
to be informed by the “plain meaning” of the statutes in question,211 
neither challenges the main objective of Florida lien law—to move 
parties toward resolution of their dispute. In this vein, the law of 
contract and further statutory revision may offer a more productive 
path forward than requiring courts to choose between one position 
or the other as a reaction to confusingly crafted laws. 
 
 210 Id. at 13–14 (internal citations omitted). 
 211 See id. at 5; Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, 
at 1. 
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C. A Better Approach 
Florida’s “new” aviation lien laws effectively put the possession 
versus notice problem to rest relative to the issue of perfection, but 
they also unintentionally generate a number of important questions. 
First, the law’s impact on the rights of lienors against third parties 
who may acquire an interest in the property without actual or con-
structive notice of the lien is unclear.212 Also ambiguous is the role 
(if any) and scope of possession in a notice-only scheme. Finally, 
the need for a comprehensive and streamlined statutory regime for 
aircraft mechanic’s liens remains. This Part addresses these issues 
by highlighting the importance of contract law in the context of dis-
putes arising from aircraft maintenance and repair services and then 
recommending a legislative (and potentially judicial) fix. 
As an initial matter, Florida’s aviation mechanic’s lien statutes 
are silent as to the issue of privity. The Commercial Jet, Inc. litiga-
tion demonstrated as much. That is, who the maintenance company 
sued was a contentious point that was briefed213 (though unmen-
tioned in the published decision). Specifically, the lienor there sued 
the owner (U.S. Bank) of the aircraft on which it did work instead 
of the entity that hired it to perform maintenance and repair services, 
namely U.S. Bank’s lessee (Silver Jet).214 The lienor apparently did 
so because Silver Jet was engaged in bankruptcy dissolution pro-
ceedings in England, and U.S. Bank had retaken possession of its 
leased aircraft.215 U.S. Bank argued that it was not aware of the re-
pairs made on the aircraft or of Silver Jet’s default and that the lienor 
had failed to give it notice before filing its claim.216 It also noted that 
in jurisdictions like Texas, owner-consent is required to have a valid 
mechanic’s lien on an aircraft.217 In this context, for the bank, in its 
role as aircraft lessor, holding an aircraft owner responsible for work 
it did not commission or know about represented an 
 
 212 See J.V. Air Maint., Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379, 383 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
 213 See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 3. 
 214 Id. at 5. 
 215 Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 2. 
 216 See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 5. 
 217 Id. at 16 (citing Astraea Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Nations Air Inc., 172 F.3d 
390, 393–95 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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implausible reading of the applicable statutes [that] 
achieves no useful public policy. The far better norm 
is that a possessory lien requires possession, which is 
supported by both the plain language of section 
713.58 and existing precedent. Commercial Jet 
should have held the aircraft and insisted upon pay-
ment or required a deposit that could have been for-
feited. Imposing lax rules on seeking liens against 
aircraft owners is not a reasonable solution. It is un-
fair to parties who had nothing to do with the non-
payment for services, and it does not foster efficient 
dispute resolution. There is no reason to bend the 
rules of possessory liens in Florida from what ap-
pears on the face of section 713.58 and what cases 
have recognized for decades: no possession, no pos-
sessory lien.218 
What this argument brought into focus was the uncertainty cre-
ated by Florida’s aviation mechanic’s lien and how helpful it would 
be to have, as other states do, a statute identifying the parties falling 
within its ambit. It also highlighted an underappreciated mechanism 
that MROs and their clients can and should deploy to avoid pro-
tracted litigation that turns on statutory construction: contracts. 
In fact, the best strategy for a person who has furnished labor, 
services, fuel, or materials for an aircraft to collect a debt owed to it 
may well be to avoid Florida’s lien statutes altogether. It is true that, 
under the amended version of section 329.51, debtors may be less 
incentivized to pay up front, or even pursuant to a written agreement, 
because they might expect return of their property as a matter of law. 
By committing their relationship to a written contract, however, ar-
tisans and their clients will be spared the task of navigating through 
a maze of imperfectly worded laws, and they will have the power to 
proactively secure both payment and possession on terms acceptable 
to each. 
In Commercial Jet, Inc., for example, the maintenance company 
and its client, Silver Jet, had an agreement in place that expressly 
 
 218 Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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limited the lien that the artisan could seek to a mechanic’s lien re-
quiring possession.219 It provided that the maintenance company  
shall not suffer or permit any lien or encumbrance to 
be created or exist against the Aircraft by reason of 
the Services performed hereunder, other than [its] 
mechanics lien, if any, and [the maintenance com-
pany] agrees to immediately release the Aircraft to 
Customer upon completion of the Services and pay-
ment of all charges in accordance with this Agree-
ment.220 
The agreement thus expressly recognized Commercial Jet’s right to 
hold the aircraft under a mechanic’s lien, insist on full payment, and 
sue for breach of contract.221 As such, U.S. Bank argued that: 
Aircraft service providers like Commercial Jet do not 
require any special lien rights. They already have the 
same contractual rights that any other service pro-
vider has. As other courts have recognized, the most 
efficient way to ensure payment is for the service 
provider to demand payment before release of the 
aircraft. In the alternative, deposits can be sought and 
then forfeited if payment is not made.222 
“Hold the aircraft. Demand payment. If Commercial Jet had done 
that, as its own services agreement set forth, there would have been 
no dispute here,”223 U.S. Bank asserted. 
Invariably, parties will fail to enter into an agreement and assert 
control over their future dealings and avert legal controversies, or 
they will draft ineffective agreements, or they will fail to act upon 
their agreement as apparently was the case in Commercial Jet, Inc. 
In those cases, Florida’s statutory law will remain the default, much 
the same way the state’s intestacy scheme is triggered in the absence 
 
 219 See id. at 4. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 8. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 7. 
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of a decedent’s will or testamentary trust. As it stands, however, the 
law in Florida with respect to aircraft liens is still indefinite. 
The 2019 amendments certainly clarify a key issue—namely, 
that possession is unnecessary for perfection. Yet, that may not nec-
essarily discourage lienors from asserting a possessory interest and, 
in fact, possession may continue to be of significant strategic im-
portance for a lienor. So, even if notice is now the mechanism for 
achieving perfection of a mechanic’s lien in Florida, section 329.51 
appears to have retained its possessory nature by virtue of its refer-
ence to section 713.58, putting Florida in the company of Alabama, 
Idaho, and Oregon—states that appear to have both possessory and 
non-possessory mechanic’s liens.224 If this is not the case, then ref-
erence to section 713.58 in section 329.51 does not make sense and 
should be deleted. 
In any case, even if the amendments to Chapter 329 are inter-
preted as unambiguously recognizing notice over possession for 
purposes of perfection, enforcement-related questions remain. For 
example, given the new statutory language that “possession of the 
aircraft is not required in order to perfect such lien,”225 do aviation 
mechanic’s liens still fall within Part II of Chapter 713, which ap-
plies to possessory liens? If not, then application of Chapter 85, gov-
erning enforcement of statutory liens “provided for by . . . part II of 
Chapter 713”226 to aviation mechanic’s liens no longer matters, and 
it would seem the three-month limitation on a lienor’s possessory 
right under section 85.011227 no longer applies to aircraft. If all this 
is correct, lienors could conceivably assert a possessory interest on 
an aircraft indefinitely and potentially at little cost other than per-
haps a replevin action. After all, possession may not be required for 
perfection, but it certainly could be effective in creating enormous 
leverage in favor of a lienor. This would bring Florida law closer to 
the common law rule allowing a lienor (who has otherwise perfected 
his lien via notice under section 329.51) to retain possession of an 
aircraft for as long as a debt remained outstanding.228 Finally, does 
the updated language in section 329.51 eviscerate the coherent plan 
 
 224 See supra notes 190–92. 
 225 FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020). 
 226 FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020). 
 227 FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020). 
 228 See supra Part III.A. 
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envisioned in J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc., which was predicated on 
the 2017 version of the statute?229 
What all of these questions recommend is that the Legislature 
further and substantially revamp Florida law, once and for all, to 
achieve a cohesive standalone statutory regime for aircraft liens that 
is independent of Chapter 713. To do so, a comprehensive view of 
mechanic’s liens around the nation is helpful. The Appendix to this 
Article provides such a wide-ranging study and reveals that certain 
core issues arise again and again in the context of aircraft liens. Flor-
ida lawmakers would do well to borrow aspects of these laws to 
fashion its own statutory regime consistent with its policy goals of 
balancing the objectives of securing payment for artisans without 
exacting an unnecessarily heavy toll on aircraft owners and opera-
tors. 
Certain trends are discernable from a review of the aviation me-
chanic’s lien laws of every state. For instance, seven issues seem to 
be core to the subject matter of mechanic’s liens around the nation: 
(1) how to perfect the lien (possession and/or notice and/or filing); 
(2) how to perfect the lien if possession is lost, either voluntarily or 
by fraud; (3) lien duration; (4) bonding;230 (5) attorneys’ fees; (6) 
foreclosure or sale of aircraft; and (7) priority.231  
This Article recommends creation of an omnibus mechanic’s 
lien law in Florida that addresses each of these matters. Doing so 
will ease the burden on practitioners and courts who must (still) 
wade through numerous statutory provisions that lack an over-arch-
ing coherence. Florida’s aviation mechanic’s liens could be 
amended further, as follows: 
 
 The Legislature should blend sections 329.41 and 329.51 
to avoid duplication, as both cover the issue of liens for 
fuel furnished to aircraft. In this regard, the reference to 
section 329.41 in section 329.51 should be deleted. 
 
 Reference in section 329.51 to section 713.58 should be 
deleted. If possession is no longer a predicate of perfec-
tion, as section 329.51 now explicitly says, the reference 
 
 229 See supra Part II. 
 230 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-45-205 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 713.76 (2020). 
 231 See infra Appendix. 
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to Florida’s possessory general mechanic’s lien law no 
longer makes sense and may simply promote further con-
fusion. Indeed, if the law allows the lienor to secure his 
interest simply by recording his claim of lien, fairness 
requires that he also relinquish possession. 
 
 Section 329.51 should incorporate the language of sec-
tion 713.58(3) or otherwise expressly criminalize con-
duct that improperly induces a lienholder to relinquish 
possession. 
 
 Section 329.51 nowhere references Chapter 85, which 
relates to enforcement of statutory liens. It should do so. 
Better yet, section 329.51 should explicitly detail the en-
forcement mechanisms for aircraft mechanic’s liens, 
borrowing language from sections 85.011 to 85.051 as 
appropriate. 
 
 The Legislature should specify whether the lien has an 
expiration date. Relatedly, to the extent section 85.011 
no longer applies to section 329.51, lawmakers should 
specify the length of time a lienor can maintain posses-
sion. Wyoming law, for example, provides that the right 
of possession terminates six months after the date upon 
which the charges become due and payable unless the 
claimant commences proceedings to foreclose the 
lien.232 
 
 An attorneys’ fee provision should be added in favor of 
the prevailing party, or perhaps even to the extent al-
lowed in Indiana whereby the plaintiff may “recover 
 
 232 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102 (West 2020); see also 770 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 45/1, 45/2 (LexisNexis 2020) (stating that any person firm, or cor-
poration who has a lien under the statute has a lien “for a period of one year from 
and after the completion of such expenditure . . . notwithstanding the fact that the 
possession of such chattel has been surrendered to the owner, or lawful possessor 
thereof.”). 
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reasonable attorneys’ fees” in a suit in which the plaintiff 
“recovers judgment in any sum.”233 
 
By adding some or all of these (and other) features, the Legislature 
can establish reasonable tradeoffs that properly acknowledge the 
practical and legal vulnerabilities of artisans who improve personal 
property, while incentivizing debtors to resolve their debts quickly. 
Additionally, a number of other laws contain provisions that 
Florida lawmakers might find useful. The Aeronautics Code of the 
State of Michigan is a useful template, for example. Not only does 
Michigan’s aeronautics code include most of the core components 
identified above, but it also does so in one place.234 It makes clear 
statements like “the common law garage keeper’s lien as to an air-
craft is abolished.”235 Texas law similarly communicates clear 
standards that allow courts and litigants to focus on the merits of a 
lien rather than procedural aspects of the lien. That is, Texas law 
provides that an artisan is entitled to the amount due under a con-
tract, or where no amount is specific, the reasonable and usual com-
pensation for such work.236 Texas law also requires that a lienholder 
who retains possession of an aircraft must notify the owner.237 Mod-
eling the form and substance of these laws would be a breath of fresh 
air compared to Florida’s current scheme that wanders across mul-
tiple statutes often without citation or reference points. 
Finally, lawmakers should also consider fortifying the equitable 
powers of courts with respect to aircraft liens. Ideally, the legacy of 
the now-overturned Commercial Jet, Inc. is that nobody will claim 
that lien laws are plain to apply or that application of Florida’s me-
chanic’s lien laws are rigid. To the extent parties have a written con-
tract that indicates an intention to charge a particular property with 
a debt or obligation, courts should strive to serve the equities of par-
ticular situations or cases. To be sure, parties should be spending 
their time resolving the substantive merits of their dispute, and 
courts are generally inherently well equipped to eliminate or punish 
 
 233 IND. CODE § 32-33-10-9 (2020) (emphasis added). 
 234 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 259.205–.205b (West 2020). 
 235 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.205a(3) (West 2020). 
 236 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.301 (West 2019). 
 237 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.304 (West 2019). 
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plaintiffs who would wrongfully assert liens and debtors who game 
statutory ambiguities to avoid legitimate obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, the Florida Legislature’s amendments to 
sections 329.41 and 329.51, clarifying that possession is no longer a 
precondition to perfection of an aviation mechanic’s lien, resolves 
decades of confusion for Florida aviation and commercial lawyers. 
But, reduced to its essence, the legislative changes reflect that law-
makers have merely swapped out a possession-for-perfection 
scheme for a notice-is-all-that-is-required-for-perfection regime. 
Apparently the lienor’s bar had the better lobbyists this time around. 
But is that how a lasting and principled body of law should be de-
veloped? 
This Article has argued that it is not. Both artisans and the own-
ers and operators of the aircraft to which they provide labor, ser-
vices, fuel, and materials have compelling reasons for preferring one 
statutory scheme over another in terms of lien perfection. As such, 
the Florida Legislature should substantially amend Chapter 329 and 
produce a cohesive set of aviation laws that reflects the competing 
objectives and vulnerabilities of all parties involved in aviation lien 
cases. Lawmakers have all the tools they need to accomplish this, 
beginning and perhaps ending with the mechanic’s lien laws of 
every state. While lawmakers need not—and should not—put the 
policy decisions of other jurisdictions ahead of issues of particular 
importance to Floridians and the state of Florida (which is itself a 
uniquely important platform for aviation and aerospace), this Article 
has shown that certain recurring issues arise in every aviation me-
chanic’s lien case and those issues should be packaged together in a 
single standalone law, providing predictability and stability for cred-





















“Any . . . mechanic who 
contributes his labor and 
material . . . to the pro-
duction, manufacture, or 
repair of any vehicle [or] 
machine . . . shall have a 
lien thereon . . . with no-
tice of such lien . . . .” 
Ala. Code § 35-11-110 
(2021). “Alabama is one 
of the states which pro-
vides two mechanic’s 
liens . . . . [T]he statu-
tory mechanic’s 
lien . . . merely supple-
ments, not supplants, the 
common law mechanic’s 
lien. The common law 
lien is a possessory lien 
and is lost by release of 
the property. The statu-
tory lien is not depend-
ent upon maintaining 
possession, but may be 
perfected after release of 
the property.” Peavy’s 
Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. As-
socs. Fin. Servs. Co., 
335 So. 2d 169, 170–71 




















“The lien claimant shall, 
before delivery of the 
chattel to the owner or 
the authorized agent of 
the owner, record a lien 
notice in the office of the 
recorder of the recording 
district where the chattel 
is situated and in which 
the labor, skill, and mate-
rials are expended on the 
chattel.” Alaska Stat. 










“If a proprietor has a lien 
on an aircraft . . . the pro-
prietor who provides la-
bor, materials, supplies 
and storage for air-
craft may relinquish pos-
session of the aircraft and 
retain the lien by record-
ing the lien with the 
county recorder of the 
county in which the la-
bor, materials, supplies 
or storage were provided. 
The lien shall be filed 
with the county recorder 
within thirty days after 
possession is relin-
quished.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-1022(C) 
(2021) (emphasis added). 
 
  
















“If the lienholder has 
voluntarily parted with 
possession of any 
property upon which 
he or she has a lien un-
der the provisions of 
this subchapter, he or 
she may still avail him-
self or herself of the 
lien within one hun-
dred twenty (120) days 
after the work or labor 
is done or performed or 
materials fur-
nished . . . by filing 
with the clerk of the 
circuit court . . . a just 
and true itemized ac-
count for the demand 
due . . . .” ARK. CODE 






















“[E]very person has a 
lien dependent upon 
possession for the 
compensation to 
which is legally enti-
tled for making re-
pairs or performing 
labor upon, and fur-
nishing supplies or 
materials for . . . any 
aircraft . . . .” CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1208.61 (Deering 
2021). 
“Whenever the lien 
upon any aircraft is 
lost by reason of the 
loss of possession 
through trick, fraud, 
or device, the repos-
session of such air-
craft by the lienholder 
revives the lien, but 
the lien so revived is 
subordinate to any 
right, title, or interest 
of any person under 
any sale, transfer, en-
cumbrance, lien, or 
other interest ac-
quired or secured in 
good faith and for 
value between the 
time of the loss of 
possession and the 
time of repossession.” 
CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 1208.64 
(Deering 2021). 

















“Any mechanic or 
other person who 
makes, alters, re-
pairs, or bestows la-
bor upon any article 
of personal prop-
erty, at the request 
of the owner of such 
personal property or 
his agent shall have 
a lien upon such 
property for the 
amount due for such 
labor done or mate-
rial furnished and 
for all costs incurred 
in enforcing such 
lien.” COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 38-20-106 
(2020); see also 
Wenz v. McBride, 
36 P. 1105, 1106 
(Colo. 1894) 
(“There must be a 




ment to that effect, 
be any lien.”). 
















“Any person who 
stores, cares for, 
maintains, repairs, or 
furnishes any ser-
vices, gasoline, acces-
sories, materials, or 
other supplies at the 
request of or with the 
consent of the owner, 
his agent or legal pos-
sessor of an air-
craft . . . has a lien 
upon the aircraft until 
the sum due for any 
fees, expenses, or 
charges . . . has been 
paid. The lienor shall 
be entitled to retain 
possession of the air-
craft until the 
amount . . . has been 
paid or the lien has 
been dissolved.” 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 49-92g (2019). 
“Upon the possession 
of the aircraft by a 
lienor, he shall cause 
a notice of an aircraft 
lien, in duplicate, to 
be filed on a form pro-
vided by the Secretary 
of the State with the 
office of the secre-
tary . . . .” CONN. 




















for lien sale or 
file replevin 
action within 
ten days of loss 
of possession 
“In case, either before 
or after the price or 
reward become due 
and payable, the 
lienholder . . . loses 
possession of the en-
cumbered property, 
except by court order 
pursuant to this chap-
ter, the lienholder’s 
lien shall continue in 
full force and effect, 
provided that within 
[ten] days from the 
time of the loss of 
possession the 
lienholder pursuant 
to § 3903 of this title 
files an application 
for the issuance of an 
authorization to con-
duct a lien sale or 
files a counterclaim 
for the sale of the en-
cumbered property 
pursuant to this chap-
ter in a replevin ac-
tion brought pursuant 
to Chapter 95 of Title 
10 by the owners or 
other persons claim-
ing an interest in the 
property.” DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 25, 
§ 3902 (2020) (em-
phasis added). 
  
















“Any mechanic or ar-
tisan who shall make, 
alter, or repair any ar-
ticle of personal prop-
erty at the request of 
the owner shall have 
a lien thereon for his 
just and reasonable 
charges for his work 
done and materials 
furnished, and may 
retain the same in his 
possession until said 
charges are paid; but 
if possession is parted 
with by his consent 
such lien shall 
cease.” D.C. CODE 
§ 40-307.01 (2021) 
(emphasis added). 
















days of service) 
“Any lien claimed on 
an aircraft under [sec-
tion] 329.41 or [sec-
tion] 713.58 is en-
forceable when the 
lienor records a veri-
fied lien notice with 
the clerk of the circuit 
court in the county 
where the aircraft was 
located at the time the 
labor, services, fuel, 
or material was last 
furnished. The lienor 
is not required to pos-
sess the aircraft to 
perfect such lien. The 
lienor must record 
such lien notice 
within [ninety] days 
after the time the la-
bor, services, fuel, or 
material was last fur-
nished.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 329.51 (2020) 
 
  
















“Such lien may be as-
serted by the reten-
tion of the aircraft or 
aircraft engines, and 
if such lien is asserted 
by retention of the 
aircraft or aircraft en-
gines, the lienor shall 
not be required to 
surrender the aircraft 
or the aircraft engine 
to the holder of a sub-
ordinate security in-
terest or lien. When 
possession of the air-
craft or aircraft en-
gine is surrendered 
by the person claim-
ing the lien, the per-
son claiming the lien 
shall, within [ninety] 
days after such re-
pair, storage, service, 
supplies, accessories, 
or contracts of in-
demnity are fur-
nished [provide writ-
ten notice of the de-
tails of the debt and 
airplane at issue, in-
cluding its owners].” 




















“A person who makes, al-
ters, or repairs any article of 
personal property at the re-
quest of the owner of the 
property, shall have a lien 
on the property for the rea-
sonable charges for the 
work done and materials 
furnished, excluding stor-
age charges, and may retain 
possession of the property 
until the charges are 
paid . . . .” HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 507-18 (Lex-

















“Any person . . . who ex-
pends labor, skill, or mate-
rial upon an aircraft . . . has 
a special lien, dependent 
upon possession, on the air-
craft for the just and reason-
able charges for the labor 
performed and material fur-
nished up to the amount of 
the written estimate or sub-
sequent oral written modifi-
cations thereto.” IDAHO 
CODE § 45-1101(1) (2020). 
The lien “[i]s not dependent 
upon possession by the re-
pairperson” provided the 
lien is recorded with the 
FAA aircraft registry and is 
a created by written contract 
between the parties. IDAHO 
CODE § 45-1102 (2020). 
 
  





















“Every person . . . who has 
expended labor, skill or ma-
terials upon any chattel, or 
has furnished storage for 
said chattel, at the request of 
its owner, reputed owner, or 
authorized agent of the 
owner, or lawful possessor 
thereof, shall have a lien 
upon such chattel beginning 
on the date of the com-
mencement of such ex-
penditure . . . for a period of 
one year from and after the 
completion of such expendi-
ture . . . notwithstanding the 
fact that the possession of 
such chattel has been surren-
dered to the owner, or lawful 
possessor thereof.” 770 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45/1(LexisNexis 2020). 
“Such lien shall cease at the 
expiration of [sixty] days 
from the date of the delivery 
of such chattel to the owner 
thereof, or his duly author-
ized agent, unless the lien 
claimant shall within 60 
days, file in the office of the 
recorder of the county in 
which the labor, skill and 
materials were expended on 
such chattel, or storage fur-
nished for such chattel, a 
lien notice . . . .” 770 ILL. 
















6 (2020).  
Recording 
“A person seeking to ac-
quire a lien upon . . . an 
airplane . . . whether the 
claim to be secured by the 
lien is then due or not, 
must file in the recorder’s 
office the county where 
[the repair service was 
performed] . . . a notice 
in writing of the intention 
to hold the lien upon 









“Any person who renders 
any service or furnishes 
any material in the mak-
ing, repairing, improving, 
or enhancing the value of 
any inanimate personal 
property, with the assent 
of the owner, express or 
implied, shall have a lien 
thereon for the agreed or 
reasonable compensation 
for the service and mate-
rial while such property is 
lawfully in the person’s 
possession, which pos-
session the person may 
retain until such compen-
sation is paid . . . .” IOWA 
CODE § 577.1 (2021) 
(emphasis added). 
  















“If such property shall 
come into the lien claim-
ant’s possession for the 
purpose of having the 
work, repairs or improve-
ments made or the equip-
ment replaced, added or 
installed thereon, such 
lien shall be valid as long 
as the lien claimant re-
tains possession of the 
property, and the claim-
ant of the lien may retain 
the same after parting 
with the possession of the 
property by filing within 
[ninety] days in the office 
of the register of deeds, 
under oath, a statement of 
the items of the account 
and a description of the 
property on which the 
lien is claimed . . . .” 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
201 (2020) (emphasis 
added). 
“If the lien claimant was 
never in possession of the 
property, the lien claim-
ant may retain the lien by 
filing, within [ninety] 
days after the date upon 
which work was last per-
formed . . . .” Id. 
 
  


















“Any person engaged in 
the business of selling, 
repairing or furnishing 
accessories or supplies 
for motor vehicles shall 
have a lien on the motor 
vehicle for the reasona-
ble or agreed 
charges . . . and may de-
tain any motor vehicle 
in his possession on 
which work has been 
done by him until the 
reasonable or agreed 
charge therefor has been 
paid. The lien shall not 
be lost by the removal of 
the motor vehicle from 
the garage or premises 
of the person perform-
ing labor, repairing or 
furnishing accessories 
or supplies therefor, if 
the lien shall be as-
serted within six (6) 
months by filing in the 
office of the county clerk 
a statement showing the 
amount and cost of ma-
terials furnished or la-
bor performed on the 
vehicle.” KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 376.270 
(LexisNexis 2020) (em-
phasis added). 















“Any person claiming a 
privilege on an air-
craft . . . may record the 
privilege on the aircraft 
by filing a notice or a 
claim with the Federal 
Aviation Administration 
– Aircraft Registry not 
later than the ninetieth 
day after the labor, ser-
vices, fuel, and materials 
were furnished.” LA. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:4512(A)(1) (2020). 
“[W]hen the aircraft re-
mains in the possession of 
the privilege holder, and 
the debt due thereon re-
mains unpaid for more 
than ninety days from the 
date on which the last la-
bor was per-
formed . . . the holder of 
such privilege may sell 
such property at private 
sale and without appraise-
ment, after advertising 
such property for ten days 
as provided by law in case 
of judicial sale of mova-
bles.” LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:4512(B) (2020). 
“The privilege holder 
may retain possession of 
the aircraft subject to the 
privilege until the amount 
due is paid in full.” LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:4512(C) 
(2020). 

















A lien is dissolved unless 
the claimant files a financ-
ing statement with the Sec-
retary of State within 90 
days after such labor is per-
formed or such materials 
are furnished. ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3801 
(2019).“Said lien shall be 
dissolved if said property 
has actually changed own-










“The lienor may retain pos-
session of the property un-
til: (1) The charges which 
give rise to the lien are 
paid; or (2) The lien is oth-
erwise dis-
charged . . . . [T]he lienor 
shall send notice of the lien 
by registered or certified 
mail to all holders of per-
fected security interests in 
the property . . . .” MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 16-203(a)–(b) (West 
2021).  
“Surrender or delivery of 
the property subject to the 
lien discharges that lien 
against a third person who 
is without notice of the 
lien, but does not discharge 
the lien against the owner 
or against a third party who 
has notice of the lien.” MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 16-204 (West 2021). 

















“Any person entitled 
to a lien under this 
section, shall within 
sixty days after last 
furnishing of labor, 
money, material or 
supplies for the pro-
duction of, altering or 
repairing of said per-
sonal property, file in 
the office of the fed-
eral aviation admin-
istration aircraft regis-
try, a statement in 
writing verified by 
oath, showing the 
amount of labor, 
money, material or 
supplies furnished for 
the producing, stor-
age, parking, servic-
ing, altering or repair-
ing of said personal 
property, the name of 
the person for, and by 
whom labor, money, 
material or supplies, 
was furnished, and 
specifying the regis-
tration number of said 
aircraft. Unless the 
person entitled to such 
lien shall file such 
statement within the 
time aforesaid, he 
shall be deemed to 
have waived his rights 
thereto . . . .” MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 255, 
§ 31E (2019). 


















(up to ninety 
days) or else 
File Claim of 
Lien with 
FAA within 
60 days of 
last work 
“The garage keeper may 
detain the aircraft at any 
time it is his or her posses-
sion within [ninety] days 
after performing the last la-
bor or furnishing the last 
supplies for which the lien 
is claimed.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 259.205 
(West 2020). 
“If charges . . . for an air-
craft are not paid within 
[sixty] days after a claim of 
lien together with an item-
ized statement of the ac-
count is delivered to the 
registered owner of the air-
craft by personal service or 
service by registered or 
certified mail addressed 
[and recorded with the Fed-
eral Aviation Administra-
tion] . . . the garage keeper 
may sell the aircraft at pub-
lic auction.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN § 259.205b(1) 
(West 2020). 
“The garage keeper’s lien 
established in this act is the 
sole lien available to a gar-
age keeper as to an aircraft, 
and the common law gar-
age keeper’s lien as to air-
craft is abolished.” MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN 
§259.205a(3) (West 2020). 
 
  

















ers . . . part with posses-
sion of the property, they 
shall retain their liens 
while the property re-
mains in the hands of the 
owner, or one deriving ti-
tle or possession through 
him, with notice that the 
price of the labor and ma-
terials . . . was unpaid, 
and may enforce the same 
in like manner as is pro-
vided in Sections 85-7-
31 and 85-7-53.” MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 85-7-105 











“[T]he person furnishing 
the labor or material on 
the aircraft or part or 
equipment thereof may 
retain the lien after sur-
rendering possession of 
the aircraft or part or 
equipment thereof by fil-
ing a statement in the of-
fice of the county re-
corder of the county 
where the owner of the 
aircraft or part or equip-
ment thereof resides, if 
known to the claimant, 
and in the office of the 
county recorder of the 
county where the labor or 
material was furnished.” 
MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 430.020 (2020) (em-
phasis added). 















“A person who, while 
lawfully in possession of 
an article of personal 
property, renders any ser-
vice to the owner or law-
ful claimant of the article 
by labor or skill em-
ployed for the making, 
repairing, protection, [or] 
improvement . . . of the 
article . . . has a special 
lien on the article. The 
lien is dependent on pos-
session . . . .” MONT. 





















“Any person who makes, 
alters, repairs, or in any 
way enhances the value 
of any vehicle, automo-
bile, machinery, or farm 
implement or tool or 
shoes any horse or mule, 
at the request of or with 
the consent of the owner 
or owners thereof, has a 
lien upon such property, 
in cases when he or she 
has parted with the pos-
session of such property, 
for his or her reasonable 
or agreed charges for the 
work performed or mate-
rial furnished. A lien cre-
ated under this section 
shall be perfected as pro-
vided in article 9, Uni-
form Commercial Code. 
Any financing statement 
filed to perfect such lien 
shall be filed within sixty 
days after performing 
such work . . . .” (empha-
sis added). NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 52-202 (2020). 
 
  














“Any person who ac-
quires a lien under the 
provisions of [section] 
108.270 does not lose 
the lien by allowing 
the . . . aircraft . . . or 
aircraft equip-
ment . . . or parts 
thereof to be removed 
from control of the per-
son having the lien.” 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 108.280 (2020). 
Lienor must “(a) within 
120 days after the per-
son furnishes supplies 
or services; or (b) 
within [seven] days af-
ter the person receives 
an order to release the 
property, whichever 
time is less, serve the 
legal owner by mailing 
a copy of the notice of 
the lien to the owner’s 
last known address, or 
if no address is known, 
by leaving a copy with 
the clerk of the court in 
the county where the 
notice is filed.” NEV. 


















“Any person who 
shall, by himself or 
others, perform labor, 
furnish materials, or 
expend money, in re-
pairing, refitting or 
equipping any motor 
vehicle or aircraft, un-
der a contract ex-
pressed or implied 
with the legal or equi-
table owner, shall have 
a lien upon such motor 
vehicle or aircraft, so 
long as the same shall 
remain in his posses-
sion, until the charges 
for such repairs, mate-
rials, or accessories, or 
money so used or ex-
pended have been 
paid.” N.H. REV. 





















“Any person, engaged in the busi-
ness of . . . maintenance, keeping 
or repairing of aircraft . . . shall 
have a lien upon such air-
craft . . . and may, without process 
of law, detain such aircraft at any 
time it is lawfully in his possession 
until such sum is paid.” N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:44-2(a) (West 2020). 
“Any person entitled to a lien pur-
suant to subsection a. [of § 2A:44-
2] shall, within [ninety] days after 
the date upon which work was last 
performed or material last fur-
nished in performing such work or 
making such repairs or improve-
ments, or fees were last incurred 
for landings or take-offs, file in the 
office of the county recording of-
ficer of the county in which the air-
craft is based, or where the work 
was performed or material sup-
plied, or landing and take-off fees 
incurred, a statement verified by 
oath.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-
2(b) (West 2020). 
“A person acquiring a lien un-
der section 2A:44-2 of this title 
shall not lose the same by reason 
of allowing the aircraft, or part 
thereof, to be removed from his 
control, and if so removed, he may, 
after demand of payment of claim 
either personally or by registered 
mail if the owner’s address is 
known, and without further pro-
cess of law, seize without force and 
in a peaceable manner, the aircraft 
or part thereof, wherever found in 
this state.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:44-3 (West 2020) (emphasis 
added). 
  











ANN. § 48-3-29 
(West 2021). 
Filing State-






“The possessory lien shall 
have priority over all other 
liens, including recorded 
liens on the aircraft, except 
liens for taxes . . . .” N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 48-3-29(A) 
(West 2021) (emphasis 
added). 
“Any person entitled to a 
lien . . . shall, within ninety 
days after the date on which 
labor was last performed or 
materials, supplies or services 
were last furnished, file in the 
office of the county clerk of 
the county in which the air-
craft is based, or where the la-
bor was performed or materi-
als, supplies or services 
[were] furnished, a statement 
verified by oath.” N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-3-29(D) (West 
2021). 
“The lien perfected pursuant 
to Subsection D of this sec-
tion may be enforced against 
the aircraft, whether or not in 
the possession of the 
lienholder, by judgment of 
the court having jurisdiction 
in the county where the lien is 
filed and a writ of execution 
pursuant to that judgment. 
The court may, in its discre-
tion, award reasonable attor-
ney’s fees to the prevailing 
party.” N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 48-3-29(E) (West 2021). 
 
  











LAW § 184 
(McKinney 
2021). 
No, but lien 






“A person . . . [who] main-
tains, keeps or re-
pairs . . . aircraft or fur-
nishes gasoline or other 
supplies therefor . . . has a 
lien . . . for the sum 
due . . . and may detain 
such . . . aircraft at any 
time it may be lawfully in 
his possession until such 
sum is paid, except that if 
the lienor, subsequent to 
thirty days from the ac-
crual of such lien, allows 
the aircraft out of his ac-
tual possession the lien 
provided for in this section 
shall thereupon become 
void as against all security 
interests, whether or not 
perfected, in such . . . air-
craft and executed prior to 
the accrual of such lien, 
notwithstanding posses-
sion of such . . . aircraft is 
thereafter acquired by such 
lienor.” N.Y. LIEN LAW 
















No, but lien is 
void if posses-
sion is relin-
quished 120 days 
from surrender 
of property un-
less notice of lien 
is filed 
“The lien under this 
section survives even 
if the possession of 
the aircraft is surren-
dered by the lienor.” 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 44A-55 (2020).  
“The lien . . . expires 
120 days after the 
date the lienor volun-
tarily surrenders 
possession of the air-
craft, unless the 
lienor, prior to the 
expiration of the 120-
day period, files a 
notice of lien in the 
office of the clerk of 
court of the county in 
which the labor, skill, 
or materials were ex-
pended on the air-
craft, or the storage 
was furnished for the 
aircraft.” N.C. GEN. 















13-02 (2019).  
Possession or, 
absent posses-
sion file a state-
ment of claim 
“A person entitled to 
a lien . . . who retains 
possession of the 
property made, al-
tered, or repaired is 
not required to file 
any statement to per-
fect the lien. If the 
possession of the 
property made, al-
tered, or repaired is 
relinquished, the per-
son shall file elec-
tronically, within 
ninety days . . . after 
the materials are fur-
nished or the labor is 
completed, in the 
central indexing sys-
tem, a statement 
showing: (a) the la-
bor performed[,] (b) 
the materials fur-
nished[,] (c) the price 
agreed . . . .” N.D. 





















“[A]ny person who performs labor 
upon or furnishes materials for an air-
craft has a lien upon the aircraft to se-
cure payment for the labor and mate-
rials. [However,] no person shall have 
a lien . . . if the person has possession 
of the aircraft or if the cost of the labor 
performed or materials furnished for 
the aircraft is greater than or equal to 
one thousand dollars and the owner of 
the aircraft has not requested or con-
sented to the performance of the labor 
or furnishing of the materials.” OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.72(A)–(B) 
(LexisNexis 2020).“To perfect a lien 
that arises under section 1311.72 of 
the Revised Code, the person claiming 
the lien shall make and file for record 
with the United States federal aviation 
administration an affidavit verified 
under oath that includes the amount 
owed to the lien claimant for the labor 
or materials, a description of the air-
craft that reasonably identifies it in-
cluding the manufacturer, model, se-
rial number, and registration number 
of the aircraft, the name of the person 
for whom the labor was performed or 
the materials were furnished, the 
name of the owner of the aircraft, if 
known, the name and address of the 
lien claimant, the date that the lien 
claimant or his employee last per-
formed any labor upon or furnished 
any materials for the aircraft, the date 
that the lien claimant surrendered pos-
session of the aircraft, if he surren-
dered it, and the name and address of 
the person who prepared the affida-
vit.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 


















“[A]ny person entitled to 
a lien pursuant to this 
chapter shall within one 
hundred twenty (120) 
days after last furnishing 
of labor, money, material 
or supplies for the produc-
tion of, altering or repair-
ing of said personal prop-
erty, file in the office of 
the county clerk of the 
county in which the prop-
erty is situated a statement 
in writing verified by 
oath, showing the amount 
of labor, money, material 
or supplies furnished for 
the producing of, altering 
or repairing of said per-
sonal property, the name 
of the person for, and by 
whom labor, money, ma-
terial or supplies, was fur-
nished.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 
42 § 98(A)(1) (2021). 
“If the person entitled 
to such lien does not file 
such statement within the 
time required by this 
chapter, such person shall 
be deemed to have waived 
his rights thereto.” OKLA. 
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STATE AUTHORITY FOR 
LIEN 
POSSESSION FOR 
PERFECTION? HOW PERFECTED 
Oregon 
OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 87.152 (2020) 
(possessory) OR. 
REV. STAT. 






liens: file written 
notice of claim of 
lien not later than 
60 days after the 
close of the fur-
nishing of the la-




Lienor must also 
send “forthwith” a 
copy of the notice 














6 PA. CONS. 
STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. 






“Hereafter where any 
person, corporation, 
firm, or copartnership 
may have what is 
known as a ‘common 
law lien’ for work 
done or material fur-
nished about the repair 
of any personal prop-
erty belonging to an-
other person, corpora-
tion, firm, or copart-
nership, it shall be 
lawful for such person, 
corporation, firm, or 
copartnership having 
said common law lien, 
while such property is 
in the hands of the said 
person, corporation, 
firm, or copartnership 
contributing such 
work and material, to 
give notice in writing 
to the owner of the 
amount of indebted-
ness for which said 
common law lien is 
claimed.” 6 PA. CONS. 
STAT. AND CONS. 





















“Any person entitled to a 
lien under this section 
shall, within sixty (60) 
days after last furnishing 
of labor, money, mate-
rial, or supplies for the 
production of, altering, 
or repairing of the per-
sonal property, file in the 
office of the federal avia-
tion administration air-
craft registry a statement 
in writing verified by 
oath showing the amount 
of labor, money, mate-
rial, or supplies furnished 
for the producing, stor-
age, parking, servicing, 
altering, or repairing of 
the personal property, the 
name of the person for, 
and by whom labor, 
money, material, or sup-
plies, was furnished, and 
specifying the registra-
tion number of the air-
craft. Unless the person 
entitled to the lien files 
the statement within the 
time provided in this sec-
tion, he or she is deemed 
to have waived his or her 
rights to the lien.” R.I. 



















“Such lien shall be 
dissolved unless the 
person claiming it 
shall file, within 
ninety days after such 
service, supplies, ac-
cessories or contracts 
of indemnity are fur-
nished, in the office of 
the register of deeds 
or clerk of court of the 
county within which 
the aircraft was lo-
cated at the time such 
service, supplies, ac-
cessories or contracts 
of indemnity were 
furnished, a state-
ment, subscribed and 
sworn to by himself or 
by some person in his 
behalf, giving a just 
and true account of 
the demands 
claimed . . . .” S.C. 




















or other loss of pos-
session of the prop-
erty on which such 
lien is claimed, the 
person entitled 
thereto may preserve 
such lien, if at any 
time within one hun-
dred twenty days after 
such surrender or loss 
of possession he gives 
notice of his lien by 
proper filing thereof 
in the office of the 
register of deeds in ac-
cordance with §§ 44-
2-3 to 44-2-9, inclu-
sive, and such liens 
shall be valid against 
everyone except a 
purchaser or encum-
brancer in good faith, 
without notice, and 
for value whose rights 
were acquired prior to 
the filing of such 
statement.” S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 44-
















“A lien against any 
type of conveyance 
used in the transpor-
tation of persons or 
merchandise through 
the air, propelled by 
any sort of power, as-
serted pursuant 
to § 66-19-101, shall 
be filed with the reg-
ister for the county in 
which the actions 
giving rise to the lien 
occurred, within 
ninety (90) days after 
the work is finished 
or repairs made or 
materials furnished.” 





















“A holder of a lien under this 
subchapter may retain posses-
sion of the aircraft subject to the 
lien until the amount due is 
paid.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 70.302(a) (West 2019). 
“[I]f the holder of a lien under 
this subchapter relinquishes 
possession of the aircraft before 
the amount due is paid, the per-
son may retake possession of 
the aircraft as provided by Sec-
tion 9.609, Business & Com-
merce Code. The holder of a 
lien under this subchapter may 
not retake possession of the air-
craft from a bona fide purchaser 
for value who purchases the air-
craft without knowledge of the 
lien before the date of the lien is 
recorded . . . .” TEX. PROP. 
CODE ANN. § 70.302(b)–(c) 
(West 2019). 
“A holder of a lien under this 
subchapter may record the lien 
on the aircraft by filing with the 
Federal Aviation Administra-
tion Aircraft Registry not later 
than the 180th day after the date 
of the completion of the con-
tractual storage period or the 
performance of the last repair 
or maintenance a verified docu-
ment in the form and manner 
required by applicable federal 
laws and regulations . . . .” 
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 70.303 (West 2019). 
  















“A repairman may re-
tain possession of the 
aircraft until the 
amount due under 
Subsection (1) is paid, 
subject to the rights 
and interests of any se-
cured party in the air-
craft that has priority 
in accordance 
with Section 38-13-
205 over the lien im-
posed under this chap-
ter unless the secured 
party requested that 
the repairman make, 
alter, repair, or per-
form labor on the air-
craft.” UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-13-201(2) 
(LexisNexis 2021). 
“For a lien to be valid, 
a repairman shall file 
the lien with the Fed-
eral Aviation Admin-
istration within 
[ninety] days of the 
last day on which the 
repairman makes, al-
ters, repairs, or per-
forms labor on the air-




















“A person who makes, 
alters . . . or repairs an 
article of personal 
property, at the request 
of the owner, shall 
have a lien thereon for 
his or her reasonable 
charges and may retain 
possession of the prop-
erty until the same are 
paid.” VT. STAT. ANN. 







“The claim of lien 
shall be signed, under 
oath, by the claimant, 
his agent or attorney[.] 
The claim of lien shall 
also be filed within 
120 days after comple-
tion of alterations or 
repair . . . with the 
State Corporation 
Commission . . . . The 
claim of lien shall also 
be filed within such 
120-day period with 
the Aircraft Registra-
tion Branch of the 
Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration.” VA. 





















“In order to make such 
lien effectual, the lien 
claimant shall, within 
ninety days from the 
date of delivery of such 
chattel to the owner, 
file in the office of the 
auditor of the county in 
which such chattel is 
kept, a lien no-
tice . . . .” WASH. REV. 









“A person who, while 
in possession thereof, 
makes, alters, repairs, 
stores, transports or in 
any way enhances the 
value of an article of 
personal property . . . 
shall have a lien upon 
such article . . . while 
lawfully in the posses-
sion thereof, for the 
charges agreed upon, 
or, if no charges be 
agreed upon, then for 
his just and reasonable 
charges for the work 
done . . . to the extent 
and in the manner pro-
vided for in section 
fourteen of this article, 
and may retain posses-
sion thereof until such 
charges are paid.” W. 
VA. CODE § 38-11-3 
(2020) (emphasis 
added). 















“A lien under this sec-
tion may be asserted 
by the retention of 
the aircraft or the air-
craft engine, and if 
the lien is asserted by 
retention of the air-
craft or aircraft en-
gine, the lienor may 
not be required to sur-
render the air-
craft or aircraft engine 
to the holder of a sub-
ordinate security in-
terest or lien. If pos-
session of the air-
craft or aircraft engine 
is surrendered by the 
person claiming the 
lien, the person claim-
ing the lien may do all 
of the following 
within 180 days after 
the repairs, storage, 
services, supplies, ac-
cessories, or contracts 
of indemnity are fur-
nished: [ ] Provide 
written notice . . . giv-
ing an accurate ac-
count of the demands 
claimed to be 
due . . . .” WIS. STAT. 
§ 779.413(3) (2020). 
 
  





















“A lien claimant may retain 
possession of the property 
to which the lien pertains 
until paid for the labor, ser-
vices, materials and feed 
which entitle the lien claim-
ant to assert the lien. How-
ever, the right of possession 
terminates six (6) months 
after the date upon which 
the charges become due and 
payable unless the lien 
claimant has commenced 
proceedings to foreclose 
the lien . . . .” WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 29-7-102(a) (West 
2020). 
“If a lien claimant desires to 
continue a lien without re-
taining possession, he may 
before voluntarily releas-
ing possession file a lien 
statement in the office of 
the county clerk of the 
county where the property 
is located . . . .” WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102(c) 
(West 2020). 
“If possession is terminated 
without the lien claimant’s 
consent, he may perfect the 
lien by filing a lien state-
ment on or before thirty 
(30) days after possession 
is terminated.” WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 29-7-102(d) (West 
2020). 
 
